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Introduction 
 
[T]he rule of law is one of the United States’ greatest exports . . . . 
- U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder1 
 
In the years leading up to and following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. 
government embarked on a new legal transplant project,2 carried out through 
the foreign promotion of U.S. criminal justice techniques, criminal procedures, 
and transnational crime priorities.3 U.S. prosecutors and police—posted across 
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East—have sought 
to advance democracy and development, as well as to control crime, by reform-
ing foreign criminal justice institutions with reference to U.S. models.4 In the 
view of some, this amounts to legal imperialism: an “open and declared imposi-
tion on the part of foreign powers.”5 Others maintain that “the core of democ-
racy is the Rule of Law, and the [U.S. Justice Department’s] Criminal Division 
is its greatest ambassador.”6 Alternately celebrated and condemned, U.S. efforts 
 
1. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen of the 
United States). 
2. See generally Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Compara-
tive Law (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the concept of legal transplants in terms of in-
ter-societal legal borrowing). 
3. See, e.g., International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) Statement of Purpose, 
U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/c/crime/ilea/c11242.htm 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter ILEA Statement of Purpose]; Office of Over-
seas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training, The United States De-
partment of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/ (last visited Dec. 7, 
2010) [hereinafter OPDAT]. 
4. See ILEA Statement of Purpose, supra note 3; OPDAT, supra note 3. 
5. Fernando Velásquez, Colegio de Jueces y Fiscales de Antioquia, ¡Colom-
bia: Hacia un Derecho Penal Expansionista! 1 (2005), translated in Luz E. 
Nagle, Process Issues of Colombia’s New Accusatory System, 14 Sw. J.L. & Trade 
Americas 223, 246 n.98 (2008); see also Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A 
Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 
383, 431 (2003). 
6. Lanny A. Breuer, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., Remarks at Co-
lumbia Law School (Oct. 7, 2009). 
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are associated with a “revolution in Latin American criminal procedure,”7 the 
introduction of plea bargaining in Russia,8 a new rights-protective criminal 
procedure code in Indonesia,9 prison construction in Mexico,10 and new trans-
national crime statutes in states across the globe.11 This Article explores the 
complex implications of this emerging field of transnational criminal law.  
Over the course of the 1990s, what I will call “U.S. criminal justice export” 
rapidly expanded.12 Through the Justice Department’s Office of Overseas Prose-
cutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT), founded in 1991, U.S. 
prosecutors work in more than thirty countries to reshape foreign states’ crimi-
nal laws, criminal procedures, and crime control concerns.13 The State Depart-
ment’s International Law Enforcement Academies, established in 1995, have 
since trained well over twenty thousand foreign law enforcement officers at 
schools in the United States, Botswana, Thailand, Hungary, El Salvador, and 
 
7. See, e.g., Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffu-
sion of Legal Ideas From the Periphery, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 617 (2007). 
8. See Matthew J. Spence, The Complexity of Success in Russia, in Promoting the 
Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge 217, 232 (Thomas Carothers 
ed. 2006). 
9. See Robert R. Strang, “More Adversarial, But Not Completely Adversarial”: Refor-
masi of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 188, 210-11 
(2008). 
10. See Guns, Drugs and Violence: The Merida Initiative and the Challenge in Mexico: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on State, Foreign Operations, Related Programs of the 
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of David T. Johnson, 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Af-
fairs). 
11. See infra Subsections II.C.1-2. 
12. The use of the term “export” stands in contrast to a dominant approach in com-
parative law scholarship that understands legal institutions as never, strictly 
speaking, “exported,” but rather as transplanted or translated. See, e.g., Máximo 
Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l 
L.J. 1, 3 (2004). My use of this term, albeit in part intended to be provocative and 
polemical, seeks to capture four distinctive features of the programs examined in 
this Article. U.S. officials seek to export a U.S.-favored classification of transna-
tional crime. See infra Subsection II.C.1. U.S. programs export U.S. experts. See in-
fra Subsection II.C.4. The work of addressing U.S. transnational crime concerns is 
exported to foreign law enforcement institutions. See infra Subsection II.C.2. And, 
in providing criminal justice sector aid and advocating that shared global chal-
lenges be addressed through criminal law, U.S. officials export (or at least strongly 
encourage) a focus on criminal justice to address this range of problems—an ap-
proach especially prevalent in the United States since the onset of the U.S. “war 
on crime.” See infra Part I, Section II.B. 
13. See OPDAT, supra note 3. 
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Peru.14 As with the domestic war on crime, U.S. criminal justice export has not 
been specific to one administration or political party, but has occupied a prom-
inent place for both Democrats and Republicans since the early 1990s and 
through the first decade of the twenty-first century.15 
With the burgeoning of U.S. criminal justice export, a curious puzzle 
emerged: Although many had come to view domestic U.S. criminal justice sys-
tems in terms of failure,16 the U.S. government set to work to bring about U.S.-
style criminal justice reform around the world. As the American Bar Associa-
 
14. See International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) Student Output, U.S. De-
partment of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/c/crime/ilea/c11287.htm (last vi-
sited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter ILEA Student Output]. 
15. Leading proponents of U.S. criminal justice export have included Democratic 
Senator John Kerry, who called for the globalization of U.S. criminal justice in his 
book The New War, and Republican former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 
who worked to establish two Latin American International Law Enforcement 
Academies. See John Kerry, The New War: The Web of Crime That Threat-
ens America’s Security 169 (1997); ILEA Regional Training Center Lima, Peru, 
U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/c/crime/ilea/c25459.htm 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
16. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice In Crisis 44 (1988) (“[T]he drug 
problem in this country is severe, growing worse . . . and [] law enforcement has 
been unable to control the problem.”); Edward Connors et al., Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in Use of 
DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (1996) (reporting on 
convicted persons later exonerated through DNA testing); Jim Dwyer, Peter 
Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and 
Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted (2000) (exploring preva-
lence of wrongful convictions and DNA exonerations); Michael J. Lynch, Big 
Prisons, Big Dreams: Crime and the Failure of America’s Penal System ix-
x (2007) (“[T]he rate of imprisonment in the United States has expanded expo-
nentially since 1973. . . . [O]ur prison system is the biggest in the world. . . . Not 
only is this system of punishment repressive, but it fails at its mission of reducing 
crime.”); Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, 
Task Force Report on Corrections 597 (1973) (“The prison, the reformatory, 
and the jail have achieved only a shocking record of failure.”); Michael Tonry, 
Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America (1995) (examin-
ing striking racial disproportion in U.S. criminal justice systems); Caleb Foote, 
Faculty Address to the Graduating Class of 1978, Boalt Hall (May 20, 1978) (“But 
will our descendants judge us any less harshly . . . for a criminal law administra-
tion that would be a disgrace to any society and a substantive criminal law that is 
permeated with class bias . . . ?”), quoted in Carol S. Steiker, Promoting Criminal 
Justice Reform Through Legal Scholarship: Toward a Taxonomy, 12 Berkeley J. 
Crim. L. 161, 161 (2007); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Crim-
inal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (“As courts have 
raised the cost of criminal investigation and prosecution, legislatures have sought 
out devices to reduce those costs. . . . Predictably, underfunding, overcriminaliza-
tion, and oversentencing have increased . . . .”). 
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tion,17 legal academic commentators,18 and others19 called into question the fair-
ness, accuracy, and expense of U.S. criminal procedures, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) facilitated transitions throughout Latin 
America and Eastern Europe from an “inquisitorial” procedure to a U.S.-style 
“adversarial” or “accusatorial” criminal procedure.20 Subsequent efforts coordi-
nated by the U.S. Departments of Justice and State integrated U.S. criminal 
procedure reform initiatives, commenced by USAID, with training emphasizing 
U.S. substantive crime control priorities.21 
Despite the veritable explosion of U.S. criminal justice export programs, 
these initiatives have received scant attention.22 To the extent that a small cor-
 
17. See, e.g., Richard Klein & Robert Spangenberg, Am. Bar Ass’n, The Indi-
gent Defense Crisis 8 (1993) (reporting on severe under-funding of U.S. public 
criminal defense). 
18. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappear-
ance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 119, 120 (1992) (“[O]ur 
guarantee of routine criminal jury trial is a fraud.”); John H. Langbein & Lloyd 
Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 Yale L.J. 1549, 
1550 (1978) (“[D]eep dissatisfaction with criminal justice in this country has led 
many people to wonder whether we might not learn a good deal from practices 
elsewhere.”); id. at 1569 (“[D]issatisfaction with criminal justice is greater and 
deeper at all levels, professional and public, in this country, than it is in Western 
Europe.”). 
19. See, e.g., Kathryn Casa, Prisons: The New Growth Industry-Booming Population 
Highlights Racism and other Failures of the Justice System, Nat’l Cath. Rep., July 
2, 1999, at 15. 
20. See infra Subsections II.C.3, III.B.2. A brief terminological note is required regard-
ing the usage of “adversarial” and “accusatorial” (as distinct from “inquisitorial”) 
criminal procedures. In general, the terms “adversarial” and “accusatorial” de-
scribe certain models of historically Anglo-American criminal procedure ex-
amined in more detail infra at Subsections II.C.3 and III.B.2. In the scholarly lite-
rature referenced herein, some commentators use the term “accusatorial” and 
others refer to “adversarial” criminal procedures. Compare Langer, supra note 7, 
at 621 (examining “accusatorial” procedures), with David Alan Sklansky, Anti-
Inquisitorialism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1634, 1679 (2009) (considering the “adversary” 
system). For purposes of consistency, I will use the term “adversarial” rather than 
“accusatorial.” 
21. See, e.g., ILEA Statement of Purpose, supra note 3; OPDAT, supra note 3. 
22. The existing literature is composed by and large of descriptions by program advo-
cates of particular reform projects. See, e.g., Harry Blair & Gary Hansen, 
USAID, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for 
Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs, Assessment Report 7 (1994); 
Linn Hammergren, United Nations Dev. Programme, Fifteen Years of 
Judicial Reform in Latin America: Where We Are and Why We Haven’t 
Made Progress (2002) (citing Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Lessons 
Learned (1996)). Other studies focus on international policing rather than 
broader foreign criminal justice reform. See, e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, Cops 
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pus of comparative law scholarship addresses U.S.-sponsored foreign criminal 
justice reform, it focuses almost entirely on non-U.S. actors within recipient 
countries and their roles in implementing reform.23 While this important body 
of comparative law work has “trained us to understand that transplants of legal 
institutions are not like exports of commodities” in that both “contexts of re-
ception and origin are highly relevant,”24 it remains the case that little is unders-
tood about the significant U.S. foreign assistance dedicated to promoting U.S. 
criminal justice models abroad. Even less is known about the impact of the nu-
merous U.S. criminal law specialists sent to foreign locations to advance a U.S. 
criminal justice agenda.25 
This Article begins to fill these gaps, addressing four questions that to date 
remain largely unresolved: (1) What are the key components of U.S. criminal 
justice export? (2) How did U.S. criminal justice export take shape in the wake 
of the Cold War? (3) Why did U.S. criminal justice export programs proliferate 
in the face of pervasive doubts as to the merits of domestic U.S. criminal justice 
systems? And, (4) what is known about the resulting outcomes? 
In this Article, my central thesis is that U.S. criminal justice export has 
played a critical role in shaping how states and non-state actors respond to a 
range of global challenges—namely with reference to U.S.-style criminal justice 
frameworks—but that this approach suffers from a deep democratic deficit. 
With little regard for the concerns of citizens of foreign states, U.S. criminal jus-
tice export incentivizes foreign adoption of U.S. crime control priorities, perpe-
tuates U.S.-style legal institutional idolatry (which is often tied to systemic dys-
function), and impoverishes our collective capacity to imagine alternative, more 
effective, and more humane avenues of responding to shared problems. My 
hope is that the critical account I provide in this Article will lay some of the 
groundwork for re-thinking the appropriate scope of criminal law and the pos-
sibilities for rule of law and other development strategies. 
 
Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law En-
forcement (1993). 
23. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 7. 
24. Mattei, supra note 5, at 430; see also Langer, supra note 7 (discussing the significant 
contributions of Latin American legal elites to a regional wave of criminal proce-
dure reforms). 
25. While U.S. officials far outnumber those from other countries, non-U.S. consul-
tants also engage in rule of law promotion, though with less concern for domestic 
criminal justice administration. See, e.g., Hon. Madame J. Louise Arbour, O.D. 
Skelton Memorial Lecture at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs & In-
ternational Trade: Exporting Criminal Justice (Mar. 1, 2001) (addressing Canada’s 
role in advancing international human rights through international criminal tri-
bunals). But see James M. Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: 
The Battle of Chile, 29 Mich. J. Int’l L. 501, 527-36 (2008) (examining German le-
gal assistance to Chile in areas of criminal procedure and civil code reform). 
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The first premise of the analysis to follow, related to the “why” question 
posed above, is that U.S. criminal justice export entails an expansion to the 
global domain of what, within the U.S. context, criminal law scholar Jonathan 
Simon has termed “governing through crime.”26 This global expansion oc-
curred in reaction to both domestic and foreign factors. On the domestic front, 
in the waning and aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. criminal justice export of-
fered a manner of reorganizing U.S. foreign policy around transnational crime 
control, and promised to aid crime reduction at home by stopping crime before 
it reached U.S. shores.27 Some in the United States also believed (and continue 
to believe) that U.S-style reform abroad might improve foreign systems, despite 
any imperfections in domestic U.S. criminal justice administration.28 In devel-
oping and politically transitioning states, as increased interpersonal violence 
and theft accompanied political transitions and neoliberal economic restructur-
ing, state actors and citizens alike became interested in policy fixes that might 
improve social order.29 Simultaneously, legal elites in certain developing coun-
tries advocated criminal procedure reform in order to improve fairness and ef-
ficacy in their states’ criminal justice systems.30 Variously addressing the con-
cerns of these different constituencies, alongside other development projects, 
U.S. criminal justice exporters promoted a range of reforms for recipient states’ 
criminal law regimes. As the influence of U.S. criminal justice export grew, 
through directly coercive measures and independently embraced reform 
projects, U.S. criminal justice approaches came to shape the conceptualization 
of global problems—from narcotics and human trafficking, to poverty and in-
security—and informed the proposed models for governing these phenomena.31 
Yet, as I argue in the second half of this Article, significant problems re-
garding the efficacy and normative justification of U.S. criminal justice export 
belie its dramatic influence. From the standpoint of efficacy, there is little relia-
bly established evidence that the proposed reforms have achieved their pur-
ported goals of increased effectiveness, stability, fairness, and reduced crime. 
 
26. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime 
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 
(2007); see also infra Section I.A. 
27. See infra Section II.B. 
28. See infra Subsection II.A.2, Section II.B, Subsections II.C.3 & 4. 
29. See, e.g., Robert L. Ayres, World Bank Latin Am. & Caribbean Studies 
Viewpoints, Crime and Violence as Development Issues in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (1998); Maureen Cain, Globality, Glocalization, and Private 
Policing: A Caribbean Case Study, in The Blackwell Companion to Criminol-
ogy 417, 420 (Colin Sumner ed., 2004); Joseph Kipkemboi Rono, The Impact of 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes on Kenyan Society, 17 J. Soc. Dev. Africa 
81 (2002). 
30. See infra Subsection II.C.3. 
31. See infra Parts I & II. 
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Internal evaluative frameworks claim “success” by substituting means for ends, 
and otherwise neglect to meaningfully explore the impact of ongoing efforts, in 
a manner reflective of evaluative limitations of other rule of law development 
projects.32  
Case studies conducted by independent researchers provide competing ac-
counts of U.S. criminal justice export project outcomes. These studies suggest 
that U.S. programs, at least in Central America—the region longest and most 
intensively targeted for reform—have fallen short in significant respects.33 
Shortcomings, though, do not reflect problems altogether unique to the re-
formed systems; rather, the limitations noted abroad parallel widely decried 
failings in U.S. criminal justice systems.34 To the extent that U.S. programs 
promote resource-intensive, U.S.-style, adversarial criminal procedure, these 
efforts neglect the costs of implementing robust procedures with scarce re-
sources. These efforts similarly ignore the accumulated wisdom of leading crim-
inal and comparative law scholars, who reject in significant part the romanti-
cized preference for U.S.-style adversarial criminal procedure over other 
models.35 Whatever problems might otherwise inhere in U.S.-style procedure 
reform are exacerbated by a diluted focus on effectively implementing new pro-
cedures in favor of advancing U.S. transnational crime priorities. 
Moreover, the transnational crime priorities to which U.S. programs direct 
recipient states’ attention—including intellectual property infringement, migra-
tion regulation, money laundering, and terrorism—are in many instances in-
congruous with those states’ self-perceived concerns. Incongruous priorities 
leave fewer resources available to target other more pressing problems, and have 
resulted in the arrest and prosecution of vulnerable and non-threatening per-
sons, sometimes for politically repressive ends.36 More generally, U.S. criminal 
justice export remains unaccountable, untransparent, and disconnected from 
enabling concrete improvements to human welfare, despite its self-avowed aspi-
ration to function as a vehicle for promoting democracy and development 
through criminal law reform.37  
 
32. See infra Section III.A. 
33. See infra Section III.B. 
34. See infra Subsections II.C.3, III.B.2; see also Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of 
Latin America, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 75, 85-86 (2008) (discussing the mythology of 
“failure” of Latin American law when in fact many identified shortcomings are 
more universally shared across legal systems). 
35. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 18, at 120-22 (examining the profound dysfunction 
of U.S.-style adversarial criminal procedure); Stuntz, supra note 16 ( analyzing 
critically pathologies associated with U.S. criminal procedure); see also Mirjan A. 
Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Ap-
proach to the Legal Process (1986) (rejecting a simple adversarial and inquisi-
torial dichotomy in favor of a more nuanced framework). 
36. See infra Section III.B. 
37. See infra Section III.B. 
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Still, notwithstanding these limitations, close examination of the U.S. crim-
inal justice export experience has the potential to refocus both criminal law 
administration and rule of law development on the complex interrelationships 
between uneven development, social inequality, and criminal justice. In order 
to commence this conceptual reorientation, this Article concludes with a pre-
liminary exploration of alternatives to U.S. criminal justice export and the ap-
proaches to criminal law administration and rule of law development it com-
mends.38 
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I offers a brief introduction to 
crime-governance and global governance theory, and defines the parameters of 
U.S. criminal justice export as a mechanism of global governance through 
crime. Part II examines the institutional precursors and component parts of 
U.S. criminal justice export in more detail, exploring how these initiatives came 
to function as a form of U.S.-dominant global crime-governance. Part III con-
siders the outcomes associated with U.S. criminal justice export: first, through a 
close reading of U.S. criminal justice exporters’ own accounts of claimed suc-
cesses; and second, through an examination of competing analyses of systemic 
legal, democratic, and demotic harms accompanying U.S. projects. Part III’s 
analysis focuses particularly on several heavily targeted states in Central Ameri-
ca. The Article concludes with a preliminary account of alternatives to U.S. 
criminal justice export and associated criminal justice frameworks. 
 
I. Global Governance Through Crime 
 
A. Crime-Governance and Global Governance Theory 
 
The theoretical framework of global crime-governance that informs the 
analysis to follow draws upon two literatures that are seldom considered in tan-
dem: crime-governance and global governance theory.39 In Governing Through 
Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a 
Culture of Fear, Jonathan Simon examines the operation of crime control as a 
form of U.S. domestic governance during the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury and the beginning of the twenty-first. To “govern through crime” is to 
 
38. See infra notes 354-65 and accompanying text.  
39. One notable exception is the Australian criminologist Mark Findlay’s work on the 
intersections of crime-governance and global governance through international 
institutions such as the International Criminal Court. See Mark Findlay, Go-
verning Through Globalised Crime: Futures for International Criminal 
Justice (2008). However, Findlay’s focus is primarily on transitional justice insti-
tutions and conceptions of risk, rather than as here, on global governance through 
domestic criminal justice administration and criminal rule of law promotion. Al-
so, for a critical examination of the possibilities for global convergence on U.S.-
style constitutional criminal procedure, see Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Con-
vergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 Ind. 
L.J. 809 (2000). 
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frame a significant range of social problems in relation to crime control and to 
approach their resolution through criminalization and punishment. According 
to Simon, “[w]hen we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of 
knowledge historically associated with it—criminal law, popular crime narra-
tive, and criminology—available outside their limited original . . . domains as 
powerful tools with which to . . . frame all forms of social action as a problem 
for governance.”40 
In particular, Simon calls attention to a series of ways in which crime con-
trol and U.S. governance practices have merged. Public officials invoke the “war 
on crime” as a justification for the expansion of government power at a time 
when the social welfare state has contracted.41 Politicians “define their objectives 
in prosecutorial terms and . . . frame other kinds of political issues in the lan-
guage shaped by public insecurity and outrage about crime.”42 Political leaders 
also seize on the public’s fears of interpersonal harm, both real and imagined, to 
mobilize support for their respective candidacies.43 As political actors perceive 
that “tough on crime” rhetoric wins votes, almost ineluctably, more severe pu-
nishment and an enormous expansion of crime legislation result.44 
The consequences of these trends, apart from the massive expansion of U.S. 
criminal justice institutions and a pervasive fear of crime, include a reorienta-
tion of political discourse and social imagination toward social policy fixes that 
conceptualize complex social problems in terms of criminally culpable bad ac-
tors and aggrieved victims. Accordingly, U.S. crime control models have come 
to involve much more than criminal law and punishment alone. Crime control 
has become a form of governance itself, a manner of shaping how individuals 
 
40. Simon, supra note 26, at 17. Simon’s work builds on theoretical foundations of 
crime-governance developed by French social theorist, Michel Foucault. See Mi-
chel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan She-
ridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). Other scholars that have addressed 
intersections of crime and governance include sociologist David Garland and legal 
scholar Janet Halley. See David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime 
and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001); Janet Halley, Rape in Ber-
lin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the International Law of Armed 
Conflict, 9 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 78, 79 (2008) (noting in the context of feminist 
human rights advocacy manifestations of crime-governance in the “turn of West-
ern feminism to criminal law as its preferred mode of deploying . . . power in pol-
icy- and law-making”); see also Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New 
Abolitionism,” 18 differences: J. Feminist Cult. Studs. 128, 137 (2007) (“[This 
feminist] agenda . . . seeks social remedies through criminal justice . . . rather than 
through a redistributive welfare state.”). 
41. See Simon, supra note 26, at 33-74; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penali-
ty: A Brief Genealogy 10 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Work-
shop, Working Paper No. 268, 2009). 
42. Simon, supra note 26, at 35. 
43. See id. at 23-25, 35. 
44. See id. at 35. 
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and collectivities seek to resolve problems that might well be approached 
through other means.45 
The theoretical rubric of “global governance” developed separately in in-
ternational relations theory. “Global governance” refers to the various forms of 
regulation of interdependent nation-states and state and non-state actors in the 
international system in the absence of a formal overarching global political au-
thority.46 Beginning in the 1990s, the concept of global governance was increa-
singly deployed to describe a shift from government to governance, denoting 
increasing fragmentation and re-integration of political authority across the in-
ternational domain.47  
Whereas government is defined by the institutional embodiment of a ruling 
body ordinarily within a territorially bounded state, global governance came to 
refer to a broader range of strategies for exercising governmental power, often 
outside the framework of a traditional state. In other words, global governance 
functions as a strategy for organizing and deploying power among and within 
states without a formal world government.48 Of course, it should be noted that 
multiple forms of global governance involving states and networks of interna-
tional organizations may and do operate at once.49 
So how might U.S. criminal justice export function as a mechanism of 
“global governance through crime”? U.S. criminal justice export effectively ex-
tends U.S. crime-governance on a global scale. What I refer to as “global gover-
nance through crime” or “global crime-governance” describes a form of global 
social organization that is conceptually and institutionally structured around 
crime control. Global crime-governance directs the conduct of state and non-
 
45. Simon examines truancy, inter-familial disputes, and workplace conflict as exam-
ples of problems governed by a focus on crime control. See Simon, supra note 26, 
at 177-259. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar argues that Simon fails to fully consider 
how governing through crime became so rhetorically contagious in the U.S. con-
text, and why crime-governance is worse than alternative regulatory approaches. 
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Criminal Justice, 75 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 941, 952 (2008). The analysis of global governance through crime 
presented in this Article takes into account Cuéllar’s concerns; the Article eluci-
dates how and why global governance through crime came into being, and the 
specific mechanisms through which it operates and is sustained. 
46. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); Robert La-
tham, Politics in a Floating World: Toward a Critique of Global Governance, in Ap-
proaches to Global Governance Theory 23, 25 (Martin Hewson & Timothy J. 
Sinclair eds., 1999); James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Fron-
tier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (1997). 
47. See, e.g., Elke Krahmann, American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing 
Visions of International Security, 7 Int’l Stud. Rev. 531 (2005). 
48. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 763, 768-70 (2005) (examining varying conceptions of global governance in 
international relations scholarship). 
49. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 46. 
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state actors within and between states, mobilizing political action and framing 
an array of social concerns in terms of crime, prosecution, and punishment. 
This particular form of global governance reflects features of global governmen-
tal networks theorized elsewhere in the international relations literature, but is 
unique in enabling U.S. actors to influence the terms of global conduct through 
criminal justice frameworks.50  
 
B. U.S. Criminal Justice Export and Global Crime-Governance  
 
Before exploring in more detail the precise ways in which U.S. criminal jus-
tice export operates as a form of global crime-governance, it is necessary to cla-
rify what U.S. criminal justice export entails. U.S. criminal justice export con-
sists of four component parts, each part distinct but closely related to the 
others. These four components (explored in greater depth in Part II.C) involve 
the following:  
(1) Categorize. U.S. legislation and policy papers define “transnational” or 
“international” crime—terms used interchangeably—to include prohibited 
border-crossing criminalized conduct, with an emphasis on narcotics, irregular 
migration and especially human trafficking, weapons smuggling, terrorism, in-
tellectual property infringement, cybercrime, money laundering, and increa-
singly, environmental crime.51  
(2) Incentivize. U.S. foreign aid and threatened penalties encourage poor 
and middle-income states to address U.S. transnational crime priorities through 
the application of particular U.S.-favored crime control approaches.52  
(3) Proceduralize. U.S.-style adversarial criminal procedure reform seeks to 
improve efficacy and fairness in recipient states’ criminal justice sectors with 
reference to U.S. models.53 
(4) Institutionalize. U.S.-run training programs work to advance both U.S.-
style adversarial procedure reform and U.S. transnational crime priorities.54  
Through these four interconnected initiatives, U.S. criminal justice export 
promotes certain ideas that animate U.S. criminal justice systems. First and 
foremost, is the idea that criminalization, prosecution, and punishment func-
tion to maintain social order in an otherwise free society by deterring and inca-
 
50. Cf. id. (examining how global governance unfolds through inter-governmental 
networks of state and non-state actors). 
51. See infra Subsection II.C.1; see also The White House, International Crime 
Control Strategy (1998) [hereinafter International Crime Control Strat-
egy]. 
52. See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
53. See infra Subsection II.C.3. 
54. See infra Subsection II.C.4. 
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pacitating criminal wrongdoers.55 Likewise, if a particular social phenomenon is 
identified as harmful or otherwise undesirable, certain conduct should be cri-
minalized and thus regulated through criminal justice administration, namely 
through policing, arrest, prosecution, and, in many instances, lengthy prison-
based punishment.56 Also, “adversarial” criminal proceedings provide the best 
manner of ensuring the fair and accurate “administration of justice” rather than 
“inquisitorial” or other processes.57 In this regard, the smooth and just func-
tioning of criminal processes is best assured by a robust regime of adversarial 
procedural protections alongside a series of exceptions or procedural shortcuts 
(e.g., plea bargaining) organized to improve efficiency.58  
The first three components noted above—which work in concert to cate-
gorize, incentivize, and proceduralize U.S. criminal justice export—operate 
through the fourth, which consists of an array of U.S. training programs that 
institutionalize criminal justice export. Institutionalization involves stationing 
U.S. criminal justice personnel within recipient states’ crime control systems to 
promote transnational crime priorities of interest to the United States and 
guide implementation of new criminal procedures. Through such programs, 
U.S. officials train foreign prosecutors, police, judges, and other law enforce-
ment officials to attend to U.S. priorities.59  
 As the following Part will explore in more detail, building upon Cold War 
institutions and ideologies, and operating through specific economic incentives, 
U.S. criminal justice export induces recipient states to implement U.S.-
promoted policies. Once underway, U.S. programs channel energies toward 
combating certain phenomena accompanying global economic processes, such 
as unauthorized migration, unauthorized cross-border transport of goods, un-
authorized financial transactions, and unauthorized appropriation of intellec-
 
55. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 1.02(2) (1962) (noting the purposes of sentencing 
following criminal prosecution include to prevent commission of offenses, give 
forewarning, individualize, and harmonize); Dean J. Champion, Criminal Jus-
tice in the United States 8-9, 47-51 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining the role of U.S. 
criminal law in regulating social conduct). 
56. See generally Simon, supra note 26 (discussing U.S. domestic crime-governance); 
see also Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 Harv. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 237, 237-41 (2009). 
57. See, e.g., Comparative Criminal Procedure 1 (John Hatchard, Barbara Huber, 
& Richard Vogler eds., 1996) (describing emphasis of U.S. criminal justice on ad-
versariality); see also Langbein, supra note 18. 
58. See, e.g., Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked 
Challenge of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 651, 663 (2009) (noting 
“large [U.S.] investment in the myth of the adversarial system” coupled with a 
commitment to efficiency-enabling procedural shortcuts in relation to criminal 
justice rule of law reform in Taiwan (quoting Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administra-
tive System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2135 (1998))). 
59. See infra Section II.C. 
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tual property. In focusing attention on these concerns, the programs direct fo-
cus toward crime control and toward certain systemic players and their criminal 
culpability, and thereby shift energies away from alternative regulatory ap-
proaches, such as infrastructure development, public health interventions, or 
economic re-structuring. These and other alternative regulatory possibilities 
will be further explored preliminarily in the Article’s Conclusion. 
It is this ambition to global-scale convergence on U.S.-style criminal justice 
regulatory approaches, and the coercive and surveillant role for U.S. officials 
this convergence enables, that defines U.S. criminal justice export as a form of 
U.S.-dominant global governance through crime. Because the historical emer-
gence and institutional architecture of U.S. criminal justice export are central to 
its operation as a mechanism of global governance, it is to these arrangements 
that we now turn. 
 
II. U.S. Criminal Justice Export: Precursors and Component Parts 
 
A. Historical Antecedents 
 
Decades of U.S. involvement in foreign criminal law reform preceded the 
proliferation of U.S. criminal justice export programs in the post-Cold War pe-
riod, and past projects significantly determined the shape of the subsequent 
programs. Historically, imperial powers, including the United States, directly 
imposed criminal law regimes upon foreign territories, at times with physical 
force.60 With the advent of independence movements and post-colonial devel-
opment projects, powerful states’ attempts to influence other states’ internal 
criminal justice administration assumed a somewhat different form, characte-
rized by two competing institutional impulses distinct from, but not entirely 
unlike those at play in historical colonial and imperial experiences.61 On one 
 
60. To provide only a few examples: When U.S. military forces occupied Cuba from 
1898 to 1902, U.S. Marines established, organized, and outfitted Cuban police 
forces, explicitly facilitating criminal law enforcement within the occupied territo-
ry. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 22, at 111-12. U.S. forces also played a central 
role in criminal justice administration while occupying the Panama Canal Zone 
and the Dominican Republic. See generally Whitney T. Perkins, Constraint of 
Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions (1981). 
61. See, e.g., María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagina-
tion in the Americas and the Age of Development 18-21 (2003) (providing a 
historical account of the relationship between development programming and the 
advent of a postcolonial era); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The 
Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the 
Contest to Transform Latin American States 6 (2002)(“This colonial rela-
tionship continues to exist. . . . Law is now involved in a competition . . . with the 
United States gaining influence. As in the past, furthermore, leading global pow-
ers, including the United States, tend to export not just specific approaches or 
products but also their internal fights and the strategies used to fight those 
fights.”). 
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approach, through U.S. Cold War foreign internal security assistance, U.S. of-
ficers trained foreign militaries and police. Foreign military and police training 
provided the United States continued access to foreign internal security systems 
in the absence of explicit occupation.62 A second approach, involving benevo-
lently intended rule of law development consulting, was embodied by the “Law 
and Development Movement” and the subsequent “Administration of Justice 
Program.” These separate projects focused on “improving” foreign legal educa-
tion and enabling democratic development through law reform.63  
These two approaches—(1) foreign internal security training and  
(2) benevolently intended law and development consulting—are the precursors 
of U.S. criminal justice export. Together, they fundamentally defined the shape 
of post-Cold War U.S. criminal justice export as a form of global governance 
through crime. After the Cold War ended, these two previously distinct ap-
proaches merged, combining U.S. transnational crime control promotion and 
more altruistic rule of law development projects. As I will demonstrate, this in-
tegration of internal security and law and development consulting led to often 
unintended and undesired consequences. In order to appreciate how post-Cold 
War U.S. criminal justice export effected a synthesis of previous models, it is 
critical first to examine more closely the relevant historical institutions. 
 
1. Foreign Internal Security Training 
 
From World War II through the Cold War, U.S. police and military train-
ers, operating through various government offices, provided technical instruc-
tion to foreign internal security forces.64 This training enabled the United States 
to exert extra-territorial control on the world stage and advanced U.S. interests 
by regulating conduct within foreign states (a form of “global governance” be-
fore that theoretical vocabulary had emerged as a subject of significant academ-
ic interest).65 Between 1962 and 1974, the U.S. Office of Public Safety allocated 
approximately $337 million in training and equipment to internal security 
forces in developing states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, seeking to ensure 
support of U.S. policy during the Cold War.66 Even without explicitly occupy-
ing the recipient states, U.S. actors wielded considerable influence by assisting 
 
62. The following sources may be consulted for a more thorough treatment of these 
projects: Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: The United States and 
Latin America (1998); and Nadelmann, supra note 22. 
63. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and For-
eign Aid in Latin America (1980). 
64. See Huggins, supra note 62, at 58-196. 
65. The U.S. Office of Public Safety offered instruction to 100,000 Brazilian security 
forces from 1959 to 1972; similar assistance flowed to law enforcement agencies in 
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. See id. at 190-91. 
66. Id. 
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the internal security administration of other states and thereby enlisting those 
states in the battle against the United States’ ideological and actual enemies.67 
Over the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. foreign internal security training fell into 
disrepute: By 1974, U.S.-provided equipment and personnel were associated 
with cases of torture, murder, and disappearances in multiple Latin American 
states as well as in Vietnam.68 In response, the U.S. Congress passed section 660 
of the Foreign Assistance Act, effective as of July 1975. In principle, section 660 
banned foreign internal security assistance, but as a practical matter it accom-
plished nothing of the sort.69 Reflecting the more general rethinking of U.S. for-
eign policy that occurred in connection with these events, section 660 stipulates: 
[N]one of the funds made available to carry out this Act and none of 
the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to provide 
training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, 
or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any 
program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign 
government within the United States or abroad.70 
Contrary to its plain language, however, section 660 did not bring about 
the end of U.S. foreign internal security consulting, as the strategy of training 
foreign internal security forces had become too central to U.S. foreign policy to 
be so readily disbanded. Instead, foreign security assistance either took place 
despite the law, or was provided for through explicit exceptions to section 660, 
some enacted simultaneously to the prohibition.71  
Post-Cold War U.S. criminal justice export was authorized through this se-
ries of statutory exceptions to the section 660 ban, a fact that is significant be-
cause it underscores the peculiar status of U.S.-sponsored foreign criminal law 
reform. Though pervasive, U.S. criminal justice export is a seldom-
acknowledged dimension of U.S. foreign relations, and one that has emerged 
from a past about which many in the United States are deeply ambivalent.  
 
67. See id. at 2-4. 
68. Id. at 190-91. 
69. See, e.g., Robert M. Perito, The American Experience with Police in Peace 
Operations 18-19 (2002). 
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2420(a) (2006). 
71. See id. § 2420(b)(1) (exempting foreign security assistance related to Drug En-
forcement Agency or Federal Bureau of Investigation’s interests); id. § 2420(b)(3) 
(exempting foreign security assistance relating to maritime concerns when 
enacted in 1985); id. § 2420(b)(6) (exempting post-conflict law enforcement assis-
tance to promote “democracy” when enacted in 1996); see also Chairman Daniel 
K. Inouye & Chairman Lee H. Hamilton, House Select & Senate Select 
Committees, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 
Iran-Contra Affair, H.R. Rep. No. 100-143, S. Rep No. 100-216, at 139-239 
(1987) (examining covert funding streams for U.S. counter-insurgency support to 
Nicaragua). 
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Through section 660 exceptions, foreign internal security training and as-
sistance continued as a critical U.S. foreign policy tool into the post-Cold War 
period.72 By 1992, over 125 countries were recipients of U.S. internal security as-
sistance despite the section 660 ban.73  
As will be explored in the following Sections, the post-Cold War export of 
U.S. criminal justice unfolded under the influence of Cold War foreign internal 
security training programs. Subsequent programs evolved with more sensitivity 
to the past harms associated with foreign internal security training, but they 
would not break completely with the earlier institutional forms that permitted 
U.S. access to foreign internal security apparatuses and influence over foreign 
internal security priorities.  
 
2. From Law and Development to the Administration of Justice  
Program 
 
Benevolently intended law and development consulting, embodied most 
prominently first by the Law and Development Movement and subsequently by 
USAID’s Administration of Justice Program, is a second important yet distinct 
institutional predecessor to U.S. criminal justice export. Like the foreign inter-
nal security training experience, these projects significantly informed post-Cold 
War U.S. criminal justice export.  
From the late 1950s to the 1970s, the Law and Development Movement 
sought to bring about social and political change in developing states primarily 
by revising foreign legal education and rules to correspond to U.S. models.74 
The movement “attracted and was advanced by a highly regarded group of 
American lawyers, usually drawn from leading American law schools. Over the 
years perhaps fifty such ‘legal missionaries’ went to Asia, one hundred fifty to 
Africa, and another fifty to Latin America.”75 Movement advocates were pro-
gressive and humanitarian in their aims, seeking to “strengthen” foreign legal 
education and thereby to promote democratic legal development.76 Through 
their work, participants established channels for the transmission of U.S. legal 
expertise abroad and the beginnings of a law-based development approach em-
phasizing U.S.-style legal training.77 These efforts, though, unfolded to little 
 
72. See David Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police 
Abroad 26-27 (2005). 
73. See id. at 27. 
74. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflec-
tions on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. 
L. Rev. 1062, 1079-80 (1974). 
75. Gardner, supra note 63, at 8. 
76. See id. at 7. 
77. See id. 
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positive effect and were ultimately short-lived.78 Critics increasingly characte-
rized the projects as ethnocentric and parochial, and the active involvement of 
U.S. legal academics in such work subsequently declined.79  
Ultimately, the Law and Development Movement’s proponents realized 
that the progressive functioning of a “rule of law” is a complex cultural, politi-
cal, and socioeconomic process. It requires local knowledge and a fortuitous 
alignment of political and popular will—not things that can be engineered from 
afar by foreigners despite their best intentions. Further, estranged law and de-
velopment advocates came to recognize that the idealized vision of a “rule of 
law,” even in states celebrated as “rule of law” models, often fell short of the 
unblemished mythology they had promoted abroad.80  
The consequent diminution of legal academic interest in law and develop-
ment over the 1970s by no means signaled the end of U.S. foreign rule of law 
consulting.81 To the contrary, “state agencies, multinational corporations and 
international economic institutions, controlled by Western state interests 
through the system of weighted voting [continued] to insist upon a type of legal 
regulation of north-south relations . . . .”82  
 
78. See id. at 9, 11-12; Trubek & Galanter, supra note 74, at 1095 n.91. 
79. See Gardner, supra note 63, at 9, 11-12 (“American legal assistance was inept, cul-
turally unaware, and sociologically uninformed. . . . As the failures of this expe-
rience became apparent, American legal missionaries returned home frustrated 
and chagrined . . . .”). 
80. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 74, at 1095-99. 
81. See The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 5-18 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (analyzing three “moments” of law 
and development efforts, of which the Law and Development Movement is one). 
82. See Law and Development, at xiv (Anthony Carty ed., 1992). Despite waning 
legal academic support, rule of law development projects likely persisted because 
these projects promised marked development advances without requiring funda-
mental changes in global economic policies. Further, the Law and Development 
Movement’s auto-critique largely remained of academic interest, rather than car-
rying over in any fundamental sense to inform the work of governmental agencies 
or international economic institutions. See also Dezalay & Garth, supra note 61, 
at 3 (“In Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, a burgeoning group of 
consultants, think tanks, philanthropic foundations, and national and transna-
tional agencies has come to the conclusion that, whatever the problem, an essen-
tial part of the solution is an independent and relatively powerful judicial 
branch. . . . Law is once again, as in the 1960s and 1970s, central to the develop-
ment agenda.”). In recent years there has even been a minor resurgence of interest 
in U.S. law schools in foreign curricular law and development projects, seeking to 
reform legal education in Afghanistan, for example. See, e.g., Adam Gorlick, 
Teaching Law in Afghanistan and other Developing Nations, Stanford Law School 
Makes Legal Education a Global Goal, Stan. Rep., June 28, 2010, available at 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/june/teaching-afghanistan-law-0628110.html. 
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Then, in the 1980s, the law-development consulting model was once more 
taken up by USAID under the Reagan administration, and was applied to bring 
about foreign criminal justice reform. This investment in criminal justice 
reform abroad occurred in response to domestic criticism of the U.S. govern-
ment’s subsidies to Salvadoran security forces in their war against the leftist Fa-
rabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).83 USAID came to focus in 
particular on criminal justice sector assistance because high profile killings by 
U.S.-subsidized security forces in El Salvador drew considerable critical atten-
tion in the United States to ongoing human rights violations there and else-
where in Latin America.84 The Reagan administration wanted to provide mili-
tary aid to the Salvadoran government to fight the FMLN, again 
notwithstanding the section 660 ban, but members of Congress raised vocal 
opposition.85 To address the concerns of different constituencies, Reagan ap-
pointed a National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.86 The product 
of the Commission’s work ultimately laid a foundation for post-Cold War U.S. 
criminal justice export and its particular melding of the Cold War internal secu-
rity training and the law and development models just described. 
The Commission recommended a combination of increased military and 
economic assistance and support for “democratization.” Democratization 
would include criminal justice reform seeking to improve the investigation and 
prosecution of human rights violations and other high profile cases.87 In effect, 
U.S.-sponsored foreign criminal justice reform emerged initially as a means of 
negotiating a compromise: to continue Cold War foreign internal security 
training despite the section 660 ban, and to placate those concerned about hu-
man rights protection. Human rights concerns would purportedly be met by 
rendering Salvadoran criminal justice administration—its police, prosecutors, 
and criminal courts—more effective and concerned with rights protection.88  
This model of criminal law development assistance attained increasing in-
fluence at the same time that certain legal elites in Latin America sought to 
reform their respective countries’ criminal procedure regimes. The result was 
an institutional alliance between U.S. rule of law development workers and for-
eign legal elites.89 
USAID became the implementing agency for these reforms, and USAID’s 
Administration of Justice Program began to provide assistance to El Salvador, 
 
83. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy To-
ward Latin America in the Reagan Years 14-28 (1991). 
84. See id. 
85. See id. at 28. 
86. Langer, supra note 7, at 648. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 651. 
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Guatemala, and Colombia (and eventually to other Latin American states), with 
the aim that criminal justice sector reform would help facilitate political stabili-
ty, justice sector fairness, and other development advances.90 As the next Sec-
tion explores, foreign criminal law development consulting took on new life 
and a somewhat different orientation in the wake of the Cold War when the 
prior anti-communist logic for U.S. foreign internal security operations ceased 
to obtain.91 U.S. criminal justice export then came to consist of a lopsided syn-
thesis of prior models of Cold War era foreign internal security training and 
beneveolently intended rule of law development consulting. As we soon shall 
see, this lopsided synthesis heavily emphasizes transnational crime control in 
order to afford the United States pervasive surveillant and coercive influence 
within foreign internal security administration. 
 
B. A New War After the Cold War 
 
In the waning years and aftermath of the Cold War, international crime or 
transnational crime—terms used interchangeably in the relevant institutional 
discourses to describe border-crossing criminalized conduct—became a domi-
nant concern in U.S. foreign policy circles. Alongside an expanding domestic 
criminal justice regime, foreign criminal justice assistance grew rapidly as a 
component of a U.S.-led war on international crime. This U.S.-led war on in-
ternational crime would be largely a metaphorical war, though it would frame 
in significant respects U.S. political discourse during the post-Cold War pe-
riod.92 U.S. criminal justice export became a means of carrying out the U.S. war 
on crime abroad. As the promotion of transnational crime control merged with 
U.S.-style criminal procedure reform initiatives, these two projects became in-
terconnected components of a campaign aimed at the “development of effective 
foreign law enforcement partners and effective justice sectors around the 
world . . . .”93 
Why did transnational crime control come to so fundamentally influence 
U.S criminal justice export in the post-Cold War period? The war on interna-
tional crime responded to a set of prevailing anxieties and political obstacles at a 
critical moment of global role definition for the United States. Preliminarily, 
the international war on crime represented a vehicle through which the United 
States could remain engaged abroad to protect its security interests against the 
presumed new transnational threat of border-crossing criminalized conduct.  
 
90. See id. at 649. 
91. See infra Sections II.B-C. 
92. See Kerry, supra note 15. 
93. Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Strategic 
Plan, The United States Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/opdat/about/strategic-plan.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
OPDAT Strategic Plan]. 
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Cold War policies, such as the foreign internal security training programs 
discussed in the preceding section, had ensured logistical supremacy for the 
United States through military and internal security training deployments 
abroad. These policies were coupled with the propagation of an ideology that 
extolled the promotion of democracy and suppression of communism.94 In the 
absence of a unifying logic for continuing U.S. foreign engagement after the 
Cold War, domestic isolationist pressures presented a fundamental challenge to 
the then-prevailing model of U.S. internationalism. Anthony Lake, President 
Clinton’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, described the situation as “a 
challenge over whether we will be significantly engaged abroad at all.”95 Protec-
tionists sought limited foreign engagement; internationalists promoted “active 
American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade.”96 
While “internationalists won . . . [past] debates, in part because they could 
point to a unitary threat to America’s interests and because the nation was en-
tering a period of economic security,” post-Cold War internationalists pos-
sessed “neither of those advantages.”97 As Lake explained: “[t]he threats . . . are 
diffuse and our people are deeply anxious about their economic fate.”98 The in-
ternational war on crime, whether consciously or subconsciously, became a 
manner of fashioning “a new world order” in which a U.S.-dominant form of 
global governance might persist in the post-Cold War period. The international 
war on crime thus provided a new manner of framing internationalism in the 
 
94. See, e.g., Derek Chollet & James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars 
(2008). 
95. Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affairs, Address at Johns 
Hopkins University (Sept. 21, 1993). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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post-Cold War period that could sustain U.S. engagement abroad despite do-
mestic isolationist criticism.99 
An international war on crime resonated with Cold War rhetoric, rendering 
it a powerful framework for justifying a persistent global U.S. presence. The 
U.S. international war on crime began to shape a post-Cold War foreign policy 
agenda under President George H.W. Bush, when in the first U.S. military of-
fensive after the Cold War was declared over in December 1989, U.S. troops in-
vaded Panama to arrest then reigning political leader Manuel Noriega on nar-
cotics conspiracy charges brought in the United States.100 The international war 
on crime became an ever more prominent part of U.S. foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War period, avidly promoted by liberal internationalists, including 
President Clinton and Senator John Kerry, and widely embraced in the popular 
imagination.101 
During the 1990s, a series of U.S. policy papers identified transnational 
crime—again, defined as the aforenoted subset of border-crossing criminalized 
conduct—as a primary threat and cause of global instability. Battling transna-
tional crime became a vehicle to organize U.S. global engagement in the post-
Cold War period.102 Senator Kerry repeatedly declared that transnational crime 
 
99. The international war on crime and the war on terror are distinguishable but re-
lated undertakings. The emergence of the U.S. war on international crime pre-
ceded the post-9/11 war on terror. Whereas the war on terror has consisted pri-
marily of targeted military interventions and terror-related investigations and 
detentions, the war on international crime, as this Section describes, has focused 
on a wider range of criminalized conduct. At the same time, the U.S. war on in-
ternational crime prefigured two of the war on terror’s central strategies: more 
widespread international criminalization of inchoate offenses and expanded in-
ternational rendition practices. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 
(Nov. 15, 2000); International Crime Control Strategy, supra note 51; see al-
so James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make 
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009) (examin-
ing connections between the U.S. war on crime and the subsequent war on ter-
ror). 
100. See Curtis Marez, Drug Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics 1-2 
(2004); Richard Lacayo, Noriega on Ice, TIME, Jan. 15, 1990, at 24; Larry Rohter, 
The Noriega Verdict; U.S. Jury Convicts Noriega of Drug-Trafficking Role as the 
Leader of Panama, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1992, at A1; Philip Shenon, Noriega In-
dicted by U.S. for Links to Illegal Drugs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at A5. 
101. See supra Section I.B; see also Kerry, supra note 15. 
102. See supra Section I.B. On October 21, 1995, President Clinton signed a Presidential 
Decision Directive addressing the U.S. “international war on crime” as a national 
security concern and instructing all federal agencies to intensify their efforts to 
combat transnational crime. Between 1993 and 2000, the Clinton administration 
used presidential decision directives as a mechanism to carry out executive deci-
sions on national security matters. These directives are classified, but a  
declassified summary, PDD42: International Organized Crime, is available at 
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was “the new communism, the new monolithic threat,” and proposed that the 
United States must “lead an international crusade” to defeat it103: “[O]nly 
America has the power and prestige to champion [the] cause, forge the al-
liances, lead the crusade. We’ve done it twice before—in World War II and in 
the fifty-year struggle against communism. And we must do it a third time, and 
for the same reasons as before . . .”104 
Mainstream media outlets sounded similar calls of alarm. A Newsweek edi-
torial in 1993 reported that “[a]round the globe, intelligence agencies are re-
focusing their operations from spies to criminals. . . . [T]he threat is real.”105 
Along with other liberal internationalists, Senator Kerry advocated a strate-
gy of exporting crime control, stationing another thousand U.S. law enforce-
ment officers around the world to be the “advance guard against transnational 
crime. Our additional thousand agents must not be just cops. They must in-
clude prosecutors, trainers, [and] legal specialists.”106 The approach outlined by 
Senator Kerry would ultimately expand the Administration of Justice Program 
begun under the Reagan administration in El Salvador. New programs in the 
U.S. Departments of State and Justice would direct USAID-initiated justice sec-
tor reform in accordance with U.S. transnational crime concerns. In connection 
with this war on international crime, U.S. foreign criminal justice assistance ex-
panded dramatically, shaped by a transnational crime control agenda.107  
 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd42.htm. In 2000, the Clinton administration 
issued a detailed International Crime Threat Assessment, the first of its kind, devel-
oping further the already extensive International Crime Control Strategy of 1998. 
The International Crime Threat Assessment “identified international crime as a di-
rect and immediate threat to the national security of the United States.” U.S. 
Gov’t Interagency Working Group, U.S. International Crime Threat As-
sessment (2000). 
103. See, e.g., Peter Andreas & Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Crimi-
nalization and Crime Control in International Relations, at v (2006); see 
also Editorial, Global Mafia, Newsweek, Dec. 13, 1993, at 22 (quoting Senator John 
Kerry). 
104. See Kerry, supra note 15, at 193. 
105. See Global Mafia, supra note 103, at 22. 
106. See Kerry, supra note 15, at 186. 
107. See Andreas & Nadelmann, supra note 103, at 171. The State Department’s Bu-
reau for International Narcotics Matters, a relatively small and marginalized unit 
in the years following its formation in 1978, grew rapidly from 1991 onward. In 
1995 it was renamed the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, also known as the “drugs-and-thugs” section, to signify its increasing field 
of operations. The Bureau was simultaneously reorganized and received increased 
funding to target migrant smuggling, money laundering, and other transnational 
crime. See id.; see also Peter Andreas, Smuggling Wars: Law Enforcement and Law 
Evasion in a Changing World, in Transnational Crime in the Americas 85 
(Tom J. Farer ed., 1999) (“[T]he post-cold-war U.S. security agenda . . . is increa-
singly dominated by concerns over crime fighting . . . . The rising prominence of 
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Despite this increasing concern about transnational crime, no empirically 
documented account suggested that the targeted conduct had increased. Nor 
was there even an agreed-upon conception of what constituted transnational 
crime in the first instance.108 A spokesperson for the National Strategy Informa-
tion Center referred to the scope of the threat as “an iceberg; nobody knows the 
size of it.”109 To the extent anecdotes or inferences indicated a rise in the con-
duct identified by U.S. actors as transnational and criminal, the particular U.S. 
response—launching a metaphorical war waged primarily through the export 
of U.S. criminal justice priorities, techniques, and personnel—was not an in-
evitable reaction. Rather, this response constituted a specific strategy adopted 
over possible alternative approaches.  
So what can explain the dramatic growth of U.S. criminal justice export 
programs tied to a metaphorical war on transnational crime beyond the per-
ceived need for a new manner of framing U.S. internationalism in the post-
Cold War period? And, why did U.S. criminal justice export proliferate given 
widespread doubt as to the merits of domestic U.S. criminal justice systems? 
U.S. criminal justice export tied to an international war on crime was rhetori-
cally effective for at least two additional reasons: It promised to revive the do-
mestic war on crime, and it sought to address perceived social insecurity in de-
veloping states. 
In the domestic context, U.S. criminal justice export offered a manner of 
revitalizing the war on crime at home, which in the view of many experts had 
fallen short in significant respects.110 The narrative of the “globalization of 
 
law enforcement . . . is reflected in the transformation of the federal policing ap-
paratus. During a period when most federal agencies are merely surviving, law en-
forcement is thriving.”). 
108. See, e.g., Andreas & Nadelmann, supra note 103, at 105-106 (“[T]he internationa-
lization of crime control is substantially a function of domestic politics . . . rather 
than simply a response to proliferating transnational criminal activities.”); see also 
Mathieu Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of In-
ternational Police Cooperation (2002) (proposing a theory of the factors in-
volved in international police cooperation). 
109. See Global Mafia, supra note 103, at 22. 
110. Even in the face of reports of a decline in domestic crime rates for Federal Bureau 
of Investigation Index crimes over the 1990s (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft), drug crime increased 
and the U.S. prison population escalated dramatically amidst wide-ranging criti-
cism of the fairness and expense of U.S. criminal justice institutions. See, e.g., To-
nry, supra note 16 passim; see also Stuntz, supra note 16 passim; Am. Bar Ass’n, 
supra note 16, at 6 (examining the “inability of the [U.S.] criminal justice system 
to control the drug problem in the Nation through the enforcement of the crimi-
nal law”). Additionally, as suggested in the Introduction, during this same time 
period, high profile exonerations of U.S. criminal defendants sentenced to death 
or to lengthy prison terms further impugned the fairness and accuracy of U.S. 
criminal justice administration. See Dwyer, Neufeld & Scheck, supra note 16 
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crime” undergirding U.S. transnational crime control promotion posited that 
domestic crime was ultimately of foreign origin, and thus tied domestic crime 
reduction to reform of foreign criminal justice systems.111 Indeed, the puzzle as 
to why U.S. criminal justice export programs proliferated in the face of deepen-
ing skepticism about U.S. domestic criminal justice institutions was addressed 
head-on by proponents of export programming: Foreign promotion of crime 
control could render the war on crime at home more effective by stopping 
criminals abroad before they could reach U.S. shores.112 
The international war on crime and the accompanying export of U.S. crim-
inal justice personnel also offered a means of addressing perceived increases in 
social insecurity in developing states in the wake of political transitions and im-
plementation of economic austerity measures. By the 1990s, it had become ap-
parent that U.S.-favored economic development policies, especially economic 
austerity requirements that mandated decreased social spending in developing 
states,113 were associated with increased interpersonal violence and theft.114 The 
international war on crime and the accompanying export of U.S. criminal jus-
tice offered a solution that involved the reform of foreign state criminal justice 
and transnational crime control regimes, and avoided changing course with re-
spect to the development policies. Foreign legal elites interested in criminal 
procedure reform for its rights-enhancing possibilities served as additional allies 
for certain procedurally focused U.S. criminal justice export programs.115 
These various interests coalesced as a U.S. war on international crime (car-
ried out in part through U.S. criminal justice export programming) offered a 
means of organizing a new war after the Cold War, and a new form of U.S.-
dominant global governance. This global crime-governance regime was in some 
 
passim (exploring prevalence of wrongful convictions and DNA exonerations in 
the U.S. criminal justice system). 
111. See, e.g., Kerry, supra note 15, at 24-27. 
112. See id. 
113. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002)  
(assessing critically International Monetary Fund policies). Although the World 
Bank has officially moved away from structural adjustment and conditionality in 
favor of a “Comprehensive Development Framework,” this framework still entails 
a broader yet more amorphous conditionality, limiting aid to those countries that 
“have adequately pursued ‘good policy environments.’” John Pender, From 
“Structural Adjustment” to “Comprehensive Development Framework”: Conditio-
nality Transformed?, 22 Third World Q. 397, 409 (2001). 
114. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 29, at 420 (“Trinidad and Tobago took its first IMF loan 
in 1988 . . . . In the same year, offenses against property increased dramatically, to 
be followed in subsequent years by increases in offenses against the person.”); Ro-
no, supra note 29, at 90 (“The . . . implementation of the [structural adjustment 
programs in Kenya] . . . [was] immediately followed by a jump in the number of 
criminals and crime rates.”). 
115. See infra Subsections II.C.3, III.B.2. 
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ways analogous to the Cold War internal security training experience, but also 
distinct from it. The United States ultimately retained a significant position in-
side the internal security apparatuses of recipient states: adapting Cold War in-
ternal security training and rule of law development frameworks, defining a set 
of transnational crime threats around which to organize U.S. power in the post-
Cold War period, and articulating a particular vision of security and develop-
ment tied to criminal law, criminal procedure, and transnational crime control.  
The next Section will explore in more detail the institutional architecture 
through which post-Cold War U.S. criminal justice export has unfolded as a 
form of global governance through crime: promoting U.S.-style criminal justice 
models and transnational crime concerns abroad. 
 
C. Four Components of Post-Cold War U.S. Criminal Justice Export 
 
Post-Cold War U.S. criminal justice export has consisted of four afore-
noted and interrelated component parts, each of which plays a critical role in 
effectuating a manner of U.S.-dominant global governance through crime. U.S. 
criminal justice exporters: (1) categorize certain global challenges as transnation-
al crime priorities; (2) incentivize adoption of U.S.-style criminal justice policies 
through foreign aid and penalties; (3) proceduralize reform; and (4) institutio-
nalize both procedural and substantive criminal law reform through U.S.-run 
training programs. These four initiatives simultaneously promote a set of ideas 
about criminal justice administration and its role in securing social order within 
a polity, in particular, that criminalization and punishment best manage a tar-
geted range of social concerns. Additionally, adversarial criminal proceedings 
and trials are celebrated as ensuring fairer and more accurate results than inqui-
sitorial proceedings or other processes.116 The following Subsections will explore 
the parameters, interactions, and limitations of each of these four components 
in promoting a form of U.S.-dominant global governance through crime. 
 
1. Categorize: Defining Transnational Crime 
 
The first component of U.S. criminal justice export defines “transnational 
crime” and categorizes particular social concerns as transnational crime priori-
ties.117 U.S. criminal justice export programs have settled on a definition of 
 
116. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 20, at 1640. 
117. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts, in 
Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses 13 
(Phil Williams & Dimitri Vlassis eds., 2001) (examining the emergence of the defi-
nition of transnational crime in terms of the following eighteen categories:  
(1) money laundering; (2) illicit drug trafficking; (3) corruption; (4) infiltration of 
legal business; (5) fraudulent bankruptcy; (6) insurance fraud; (7) computer 
crime; (8) theft of intellectual property; (9) illicit trafficking in arms; (10) terrorist 
activities; (11) aircraft hijacking; (12) sea piracy; (13) hijacking on land; (14) traf-
ficking in persons; (15) trade in human body parts; (16) theft of art and cultural 
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transnational crime that includes only those categories of conduct enabled by 
processes of globalization and particularly by intensified cross-border flows of 
people, money, goods, and information.118 These cross-border crimes are dis-
tinct from domestic interpersonal harms such as murder, assault, and rape. 
More specifically, transnational crime as invoked in U.S. criminal justice export 
programs encompasses border-crossing conduct involving narcotics, irregular 
migration, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, terrorism, cybercrime, 
money laundering, intellectual property infringement, and environmental de-
gradation pertaining to endangered species.119 
The categorization of these particular types of conduct as transnational 
crime and the omission of other conduct elicits a set of specific effects. One 
immediate consequence of defining conduct as transnational crime is that the 
underlying social concern is recast as a phenomenon driven by certain bad ac-
tors, rather than as a complex or cumulative outcome caused by other underly-
ing factors, such as poverty or the demand for illicit goods in international 
markets. The approach to minimizing such conduct then assumes a policing, 
prosecutorial, and punishment-focused form. In addition, the now prohibited 
conduct achieves heightened significance as its regulation becomes eligible for 
increased U.S. foreign assistance.120 
Categorizing such conduct as transnational crime might be unremarkable if 
the definition of transnational crime was universally self-evident or uncontro-
versial, and if the crime control approach adequately addressed the factors con-
tributing to global concerns. In fact though, delimiting transnational crime to 
these particular categories of conduct is highly contentious. As a telling example 
of this, when the United Nations attempted to conduct an international survey 
on transnational crime, it received such disparate responses from contributing 
countries as to what constituted transnational crime that it canceled the study.121 
Even so, U.S. criminal justice exporters have advanced a distinct vision of what 
 
objects; (17) environmental crime; and (18) other offenses committed by orga-
nized criminal groups). 
118. See, e.g., International Crime Control Strategy, supra note 51; International 
Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA): List of Courses, U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/c/crime/ilea/c30083.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter ILEA List of Courses]. 
119. See ILEA List of Courses, supra note 118. 
120. See International Crime Control Strategy, supra note 51. 
121. William F. McDonald, Crime and Justice in the Global Village: Towards Global 
Criminology, in Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village 14 (Wil-
liam F. McDonald ed., 1997) (citing Ugljesa Zvekic, Research Coordinator, United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute). The later-adopted 
U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) relies upon a 
relatively generic and open-ended definition of transnational crime. See United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 99, at 
art. 3. 
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counts as transnational crime. This vision excludes common categories of in-
terpersonal violence and is concerned instead with international violations of 
drug prohibitions, migration controls, environmental regulations, financial 
regulation, cyberspace regulations, or intellectual property protection. These 
matters provoke anxiety for certain U.S. interests, but are not necessarily of 
equally high priority in developing states.122  
The definitional schema advanced by U.S. criminal justice export programs 
additionally overlooks numerous categories of interpersonal harm that might 
otherwise be understood as transnational in scope and arising from morally re-
prehensible cross-border interactions.123 Globalization produces at least two 
types of harms or crimes that are meaningfully transnational: harms of which 
the victims are largely the citizens of developing states, and harms of which the 
victims are primarily citizens of developed countries. U.S. criminal justice ex-
port programming draws attention to transnational crimes of which the victims 
are, more often than not, relatively wealthy Americans. Young Nigerian men 
engaged in internet-based fraud (cybercrime) primarily harm wealthy Ameri-
cans or citizens of other rich states. Street vendors of bootleg CDs and DVDs, 
who appropriate intellectual property, harm U.S. and other rich states’ compa-
nies. In contrast, human rights abuses of immigrants—which might also be un-
derstood as transnational and criminal, but which primarily harm citizens of 
developing states—are not among the transnational crime priorities empha-
sized in U.S. criminal justice export programs. In a different vein, murder, as-
sault, and rape are often inherent in sex or drug trafficking, which are U.S. 
transnational crime priorities, but the emphasized trafficking activities in U.S. 
criminal justice export programming are those that most directly register effects 
in developed states. 
 
122. A full exploration of the reasons why U.S. officials settled on this subset of con-
cerns is beyond the scope of this Article. Reasons for identification of these par-
ticular transnational crime priorities likely reflect a combination of altruistic in-
terest in containing the dangers of specific globalization processes, and in other 
instances protection for U.S. corporations whose profits are limited by intellectual 
property appropriation and other threats. Compare Robert W. Winslow & 
Sheldon X. Zhang, Criminology: A Global Perspective 482-83, 526 (2008) 
(describing harms associated with drug addiction and sex trafficking), with ILEA 
Gift Fund Initiative, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ 
c/crime/ilea/c25510.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (noting that the Gift Fund In-
itiative was established pursuant to section 635(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
“to provide a mechanism whereby . . . private industry and the Federal Govern-
ment . . . [can] team-up in areas of mutual interests,” and “law enforcement train-
ing funded by private entities is designed to assist corporations in reducing finan-
cial losses that occur as the result of criminal activity outside the United States”). 
123. The U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, for example, de-
fines transnational organized crime to include any organized crime activity with a 
maximum sentence of at least four years that was either planned, registered ef-
fects, or otherwise occurred across international borders. See U.N. Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 99, at arts. 2-3. 
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It is also unclear that transnational crime control appropriately addresses 
even the limited range of conduct at stake in the areas defined as transnational 
crime by U.S. criminal justice exporters. Transnational crime concerns might be 
more comprehensively regulated through different conceptual and institutional 
frameworks, including public health programs, alternative employment oppor-
tunities, civil regulation, or infrastructure development.  
The phenomenon of trafficking in humans, for example—one of the pri-
mary U.S. transnational crime priorities—implicates many issues beyond the 
highly publicized trafficking of women and children into forced sexual labor (a 
focus of the U.S. international war on crime and the transnational criminaliza-
tion model more generally). Human trafficking entails a whole continuum of 
migration flows that places smuggled migrants in dehumanizing labor condi-
tions earning substandard wages, in factories, cocktail bars, homes, and agribu-
sinesses, as well as in brothels.124 As numerous commentators have illuminated, 
these flows are fueled not primarily by criminally deviant bad actors, but by 
conditions of extreme poverty in the source countries and by demand for 
cheap, and often degrading, labor in the destination countries.125 The crime 
control model promoted by U.S. consultants focuses on a subset of those indi-
viduals who exploit conditions of pronounced inequality126—smugglers who 
enable the illegal flows of migrants and profit from migrants’ sexual subjec-
tion—rather than on the underlying forces driving migration flows and fueling 
the abusive practices in question across multiple sectors. In focusing attention 
on sexual exploitation, as did earlier campaigns against the “white slave” trade 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,127 transnational crime con-
trol narrows the perceived range of harms wrought by resource inequalities. It 
concentrates instead on relatively limited criminalized elements.128 The large-
scale export of U.S. crime control models then channels energies toward crimi-
nalizing and prosecuting particular criminally culpable bad actors and diverts 
global attention from systemic factors driving targeted harms, as well as from 
 
124. See e.g., Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response 
to Human Trafficking, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 20-21 (2004). 
125. See id.; Janie Chuang, Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the 
Global Economy, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 137 (2006) (examining how prose-
cutorial approaches to human trafficking tend to “overlook the broader socioeco-
nomic reality that drives trafficking in human beings”). See generally Jayashri Sri-
kantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human 
Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 157, 160, 187 (2007). 
126. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the 
New Mobility of People and Money, at xxv, 137 (1998). 
127. See Bruch, supra note 124, at 8-9. 
128. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Res-
ponses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Con-
temporary Governance Feminism, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 335, 388-92 (2006). 
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regulatory and preventative approaches that might counteract those systemic 
factors.129  
On similar grounds to those just described, some within the U.S. govern-
ment opposed adopting (at least primarily) a transnational crime control 
framework to address human trafficking. In his former capacity at the State De-
partment, international law scholar and Department of State Legal Adviser Ha-
rold Koh argued against conceptualizing trafficking as fundamentally “a crimi-
nal problem,”130 preferring instead a human rights focus that treats trafficking 
as a “massive and complex global problem.”131 A human rights approach would 
emphasize prevention and care for those at risk of, or victim to, trafficking; it 
would not rely primarily on criminal law paradigms of innocent, “iconic” vic-
tims, and individual, culpable trafficker defendants.132 A human rights emphasis 
on trafficking would not necessarily obviate criminal prosecutions. It would, 
however, prioritize allocation of resources to humanitarian prevention and re-
paration over prosecution, and would not require other states to adopt a crimi-
nal regulatory framework. But Koh’s approach did not ultimately prevail as the 
U.S. government established offices and initiatives requiring foreign states to 
define transnational crime so as to “prescribe punishment [for trafficking] 
commensurate with that for grave crimes” and to devote resources to “prosecu-
tion efforts” resulting in the conviction and criminal sentencing of traffickers.133 
The definition of transnational crime has thus come to play a critical role in di-
recting conduct within foreign states in a manner that might not otherwise have 
come to pass, shaping a regime of global governance through transnational 
crime control aid and penalties.  
 
 
 
 
129. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at 144 (“[T]he responsibility for slavery is shifted 
from structural factors and dominant institutions onto individual, deviant 
men . . . .”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of 
U.S. Efforts To Stop Human Trafficking, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2977, 3030 (2006). 
130. Trafficking of Women and Children in the International Sex Trade: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights. of the H. Comm. on Int’l Re-
lations, 106th Cong. 9 (1999) (testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secre-
tary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, Department of 
State). 
131. Id. 
132. See Srikantiah, supra note 125, at 160, 187 (discussing problems associated with a 
criminal law paradigm of the iconic trafficking victim). 
133. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 108(a), 114 
Stat. 1464 (2000). The Act was supplemented by the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875, 3558, and the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 
119 Stat. 3558 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006)). 
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2. Incentivize: Transnational Crime Control Aid and Penalties 
 
The second component of U.S. criminal justice export—related to the defi-
nition of transnational crime—is the provision of aid and threats of penalties to 
foreign states in order to encourage attention to U.S.-promoted policies. The 
U.S. government has provided vast sums of aid for transnational crime control 
to poor and middle-income states.134 Much of this assistance has been concen-
trated in Latin America, though assistance is also provided to states in Africa, 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.135  
From 1997 to 2006, in the Latin American and Caribbean region, police and 
military aid constituted almost half of U.S. foreign assistance.136 These funds 
were allocated for transnational crime control and the expansion of prisons and 
other criminal justice institutions necessary to support increased criminal law 
enforcement.137  
In the 1990s, negotiations began for Plan Colombia, a major counter-
narcotics and criminal justice reform aid package, which culminated in 2000, 
when Congress approved $1.3 billion in support of the plan.138 The reform pack-
age supports drug control in Colombia through aerial eradication, law en-
forcement, and procedural and related justice sector reform. From 2000 to 
2005, under the Bush administration, the State and Defense Departments to-
gether provided $5.4 billion for Andean region counter-narcotics efforts.139 The 
Obama administration has continued the trend of foreign crime control spend-
 
134. See, e.g., The Mérida Initiative, Assessing Plans to Step Up Our Security Cooperation 
with Mexico and Central America: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
110th Cong. 11-14 (2007) (statement of Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State) (describing major 
financial assistance to Mexico and Central America for crime control and criminal 
justice reform projects); see also Sayaka Fukumi, Cocaine Trafficking in Lat-
in America: EU and US Policy Responses 177-214 (2008) (providing an over-
view of Plan Colombia and the United States’ substantial contributions to it). 
135. See, e.g., Andreas & Nadelmann, supra note 103; Fukumi, supra note 134, at 177-
214. 
136. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, 
Fiscal Years 2002-2007 Congressional Budget Justifications, http://www.state.gov/ 
p/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (specify year to view individual alloca-
tions); see also Ctr. for Int’l Pol’y, U.S. Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1997-2006, JusttheFacts.org, http://justf.org (follow “Data” hyperlink; follow 
“Aid” hyperlink; follow “Aid by Program” hyperlink; then select years 1997 
through 2006) (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
137. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-147, Aid to Pa-
nama: Improving the Criminal Justice System (1992). 
138. Connie Veillette et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 32487, U.S. Foreign As-
sistance to Latin America and the Caribbean 4 (2006). 
139. Id. at 5. 
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ing by expanding the Mérida Initiative, which provides a broad range of crimi-
nal justice assistance to Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic.140  
In a world of limited resources, U.S. subsidies direct recipient states’ atten-
tion to U.S. transnational crime priorities and criminal justice administration 
rather than to other sectors. The significant funds available for foreign criminal 
justice assistance orient recipient states’ energies to this domain of policy plan-
ning, and subsequently require recipient states to allocate their own funds (and 
often military reinforcements) to carry out projects to completion.141  
The design of U.S. transnational crime control initiatives also directly ties 
compliance to specific financial threats, thereby strongly encouraging recipient 
states to conform despite their possible ambivalence or resistance.142 Threats are 
incorporated directly in U.S. statutes: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 
2000 (TVPA) establishes a penalty regime authorizing the President to with-
draw U.S. (and some multilateral) non-trade-related, non-humanitarian finan-
cial assistance from countries that insufficiently comply with U.S. government 
“minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.”143 As a result, the U.S. 
government has effectively required developing states to apply a transnational 
crime control trafficking model. In response to the TVPA regime and threats of 
U.S. withholding, governments around the world have passed anti-trafficking 
legislation and developed domestic infrastructure to meet U.S. prosecutorial 
“minimum standards.”144  
 
140. Like Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative emerged from international agreements 
between the United States and recipient states, and through U.S. domestic legisla-
tion. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the 110th Congress appropriated $465 mil-
lion in supplemental assistance for Mexico and Central America in the Fiscal Year 
2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-252, for fiscal years 2008 
and 2009. The 111th Congress provided an additional $110 million for Central 
America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and $300 million for Mexico in the 
2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8. In total, under the Mérida 
Initiative, approximately $875 million has been allocated. The Obama administra-
tion for fiscal year 2010 sought $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for Cen-
tral America. Clare Ribando Seelke & June S. Beittel, Cong. Research Serv., 
R 40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and 
Policy Issues 1 (2009). 
141. See Fukumi, supra note 134, at 200. 
142. See Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions 
To Combat Human Trafficking, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 437, 439 (2006); see also Press 
Release, White House, Progress in Efforts to Combat International Crime (Dec. 
15, 2000). 
143. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 108(a), 114 
Stat. 1464; Chuang, supra note 142, at 439. 
144. Chuang, supra note 142, at 464; see also Larry Rohter, Prostitution Puts U.S. and 
Brazil at Odds on AIDS Policy, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2005, at A3 (reporting that, as a 
consequence of a related incentive regime, Brazil was forced to “forgo $40 million 
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The United States assures foreign states’ compliance with its preferred nar-
cotics crime policy through a similar incentive regime. Each year the President 
reviews “drug source” countries for compliance with U.S. benchmarks and de-
termines whether to certify them for funding during the following year.145 The 
penalties for decertified states entail 50% suspension of all U.S. assistance for the 
current fiscal year; 100% of all U.S. assistance for the following fiscal year, unless 
the state is re-certified; a vote against the state’s loan applications to the multi-
national development banks and International Monetary Fund; and removal of 
any U.S. trade preference.146 Peru and Colombia both suffered decertification 
for two years in the 1990s. For a period, Bolivia, which is among the poorest 
states in the Western hemisphere and depends heavily on U.S. aid, made execu-
tion of U.S. drug control policy its top priority out of fear of decertification.147  
Similar regimes incentivize foreign states to adopt criminal justice frame-
works to address intellectual property appropriation. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement requires that participating states’ intellectual property rules 
criminalize certain forms of intellectual property appropriation, and the World 
Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement similarly promotes the criminalization of intellectual prop-
erty rights violations.148 
As perhaps reflected by the incorporation in TRIPS of criminalization 
measures, international trade organizations, as well as other inter-governmental 
organizations, have begun to embrace the U.S.-promoted transnational crime 
control regime and domestic criminal justice reforms as a set of practices crucial 
to ensuring social order and prosperity. The World Bank explains its post-Cold 
War development approach as follows: “[T]oday the Bank sees law as facilitat-
ing market transactions by defining property rights, guaranteeing the enforce-
ment of contracts, and maintaining law and order.”149 Accordingly, the World 
 
in American support” because it wished to pursue harm reduction strategies such 
as condom distribution to prevent the transmission of HIV by sex workers). 
145. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(1)(A) (2006)); see also Fukumi, supra note 134, at 143 
(“The annual narcotics certification process has been a tool to secure co-
operation from the Andean states . . . with the US drug control policy since the 
early 1980s.”). 
146. Fukumi, supra note 134, at 143. 
147. Id. 
148. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 61, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 (1994) (“Re-
medies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to 
provide a deterrent . . . .”); North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1717, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 678 (1993).  
149. See Law and Development Movement, The World Bank, http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/LawandDevelopmentMovement.
pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (emphasis added). 
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Bank’s comprehensive development framework has come to implicitly promote 
crime control reforms in line with U.S. criminal justice export initiatives.  
Through criminal justice aid and threatened penalties, proponents of rule 
of law development have advanced a particular approach, not only with regard 
to legal mechanisms for facilitating economic growth, but also with respect to 
criminal justice. The United States is at the forefront of these ongoing efforts, 
fashioning a global crime-governance regime that seeks to establish transna-
tional crime control policy on a global scale to advance U.S. crime control 
priorities. 
 
3. Proceduralize: U.S.-Style Criminal Procedure Reform 
 
The third component of U.S. criminal justice export involves criminal pro-
cedure reform intended to increase the efficacy and fairness of recipient states’ 
justice sectors. By offering assistance to foreign states to undertake criminal 
procedure reform, the United States encourages recipient states to devote ener-
gies to U.S.-style criminal procedure reforms over and above other unsubsi-
dized development priorities. To ensure compliance, the United States moni-
tors recipient states’ progress, and makes the achievement of “certain reform 
benchmarks a condition of broader assistance funding.”150 
USAID was the initial leader in this area, beginning with the Administra-
tion of Justice Program under President Reagan in El Salvador described in 
Subsection II.A.2 above. USAID’s criminal justice reform projects have sought 
to bring about more humane, transparent, and efficient justice administration 
abroad, even if, as Part III will explore, such projects have been less effective 
than anticipated.151 Foreign criminal procedure reform vastly expanded in the 
post-Cold War period when these reforms merged with Departments of Justice 
and State programs simultaneously engaged in promoting U.S. transnational 
crime priorities.152  
A primary focus of USAID’s initial justice sector reform work was to trans-
form inquisitorial systems (modeled generally on the civil law systems of former 
European colonizers) to accusatory or adversarial ones (modeled generally on 
the common law U.S. and U.K. systems).153 To be clear, the terms inquisitorial 
and adversarial refer to two general types of criminal procedure systems, and 
there are numerous distinctions within these two categories.154 Broadly speak-
ing, variations of the inquisitorial system are code-based, and criminal proceed-
ings are orchestrated by a judge or judges, who are the primary actors seeking 
 
150. Linn A. Hammergren, The Politics of Justice and Justice Reform in Latin 
America 216 (1998). 
151. See id. at 158-60. 
152. See Langer, supra note 7, at 648, 657. 
153. See Hammergren, supra note 150, at 159. 
154. See Damaška, supra note 35, at 4-6. 
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evidence from both sides and directing the course of proceedings.155 Factual de-
terminations and legal rulings at all stages occur principally in writing, with sig-
nificant importance placed on a written dossier of evidence.156  
In contrast, under an adversarial common law system, courts fill in the gaps 
in legislative enactments on a case-by-case basis, and the litigants largely assume 
control for developing cases and presenting evidence, primarily through oral 
testimony.157 In the adversarial system, the investigative authority is allocated to 
the prosecutor rather than to the judge. Presented with two opposing sides to a 
dispute, the judge or jury weighs conflicting evidence to decide which side 
should prevail.158 The rights of the defendant are protected, in principle, by a 
vigorous contest of the evidence by the defendant and his or her counsel, and by 
various criminal procedural pre-trial and trial rights. Protections for the defen-
dant include rights to trial by jury, to cross-examine witnesses, against self-
incrimination, to defense counsel, and to a presumption of innocence until 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.159  
In practice, most criminal justice systems involve both adversarial and in-
quisitorial elements.160 The reforms encouraged by U.S. consultants, to the ex-
tent that they claim to represent a “purely” adversarial model, idealize the ad-
versarial model and elide the multiple complexities and limits of both 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems in practice.161 The U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem itself is characterized by the existence of a plethora of exceptions to crimi-
nal procedural rights as well as procedural alternatives or shortcuts intended to 
improve efficiency. The defendant’s many rights, extolled by proponents of the 
adversarial model, are in the vast majority of criminal cases relinquished, vi-
olated, or waived by criminal suspects and defendants.162 Despite the celebra-
tion by U.S. criminal justice export programs of oral, adversarial, and jury trial 
 
155. See, e.g., Hammergren, supra note 150, at 14-21. 
156. See Langer, supra note 12, at 20-26. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See Stuntz, supra note 16, at 12-19. 
160. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Book Review, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 203, 203 (1988) (re-
viewing Damaška, supra note 35 (“Comparative scholarship has increasingly dis-
tinguished different kinds of procedure (e.g., criminal and civil), its phases and its 
forms in individual countries. As a result, a more refined and accurate picture has 
gradually emerged.”). 
161. See Sklansky, supra note 20, at 1640; see also Mirjan Damaška, The Uncertain Fate 
of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 839, 851-52 (1997). 
162. See Stuntz, supra note 16, at 45-52. 
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proceedings, roughly 1% of U.S. criminal prosecutions are resolved by jury tri-
al.163 
Criminal and comparative law scholars have also illuminated several inhe-
rent problems with U.S.-style adversarial criminal procedures. Criminal law 
scholar William Stuntz argues that the combination of robust procedural pro-
tections and a political commitment to social regulation through crime control 
has led not only to pervasive exceptions to procedural safeguards in the United 
States, but also to an excessive ratcheting up of the harshness of substantive 
criminal law. The one-way ratchet occurs in part because legislators and the 
public come to perceive procedural protections as interfering with the effective 
regulation of crime, regardless of whether or not this is actually the case.164  
According to legal historian John H. Langbein, another result of U.S. adver-
sarial trial and robust criminal procedure models is an over-reliance on plea 
bargaining that is both morally and politically unjust.165 The over-reliance on 
procedural shortcuts, and in particular on plea bargaining, arises because a full 
exercise of jury trial rights would be extremely inefficient. An increase in jury 
trials would grind the wheels of justice to a halt, unless the number of criminal 
prosecutions markedly decreased or resources allocated to criminal justice ad-
ministration radically increased.166 Langbein makes a compelling case that the 
widespread reliance on plea bargaining, given current case pressures and re-
source allocation, is morally wrong because it is coercive.167 The reliance oper-
ates to coerce people to waive their rights, and as the inducement to confess be-
comes more intense, criminal defendants may be persuaded to confess to 
conduct of which they are innocent, even if this only happens in practice in the 
occasional case.168 The dependence on plea bargaining in the U.S. adversarial 
system also undermines the important civic interest in public inquiry in cases of 
serious crime.169 Langbein concludes that a hybrid inquisitorial system that 
combines laypersons with professional judges is preferable to a U.S.-style “sys-
 
163. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 512 (2004). 
164. See Stuntz, supra note 16, at 55-59; see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Poli-
tics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511 (2001); William J. Stuntz, Sub-
stance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 7-15 
(1996); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519, 1594 
(2008) (examining the elimination for all practical purposes of the safeguards 
promised by the Miranda warning). 
165. See Langbein, supra note 18, at 126-27. 
166. Id. at 123. 
167. Id. at 124. 
168. Id. (“As a practical matter, plea bargaining concentrates both the power to adjudi-
cate and the power to sentence in the hands of the prosecutor.”). 
169. Id. 
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tem of adversary jury trial so complex we must deny it to almost all defen-
dants.”170 
 On the other hand, a range of serious ills afflicted (and continues to afflict) 
inquisitorial systems in recipient states. Prior to the onset of procedure reforms, 
inquisitorial criminal procedure regimes in Latin America were characterized 
by very limited due process protections for criminal defendants and prolonged 
periods of detention in deplorable prison conditions pending adjudication.171 
Recipient states’ justice sectors also suffered from general arbitrariness, ineffi-
ciency, unreliability, and a lack of transparency.172  
Certain Latin American legal elites believed the solution for their states’ jus-
tice sectors lay in an array of criminal procedure code reforms. Though not 
necessarily modeled on the U.S. code, these code reforms were adversarial ra-
ther than inquisitorial in nature, and in particular, organized around oral, pub-
lic trials.173 Notwithstanding the limitations and prevailing critiques of the ad-
versary system, a critical mass of legal elites thought accusatorial or adversarial 
models would be, if not markedly more effective than inquisitorial models or 
dramatically more rights-protective, at least an improvement over the injustices 
of the then-existing systems.174 
Driven both by the interest and support of Latin American legal elites and 
U.S. criminal justice exporters’ commitment to adversarial criminal procedure 
reform, over the 1990s, U.S. consulting firms working in conjunction with 
USAID supported new adversarial criminal procedure code reforms and other 
related projects in countries throughout the Latin American region.175 Between 
1993 and 2003, twenty-one countries in Latin America received major loan assis-
tance to support criminal procedure reform projects promoted by the United 
States. Fifteen of these countries borrowed nearly $500 million from the Inter-
American Development Bank to finance such efforts.176 Fourteen Latin Ameri-
can countries adopted new criminal procedure codes based on an adversarial, 
U.S.-style model (though reflecting considerable national nuances and drawing 
on diverse sources) between 1991 and 2006, including Guatemala in 1992, Costa 
Rica in 1996, El Salvador in 1997, the federal system and certain provinces of Ar-
 
170. Id. at 126-27. 
171. See Langer, supra note 7, at 663-64. 
172. Id. at 637-40 (citing Proyecto de Código Procesal Penal de la Nación, Ex-
posición de Motivos 651-55 (1988)). 
173. See id. at 632, 638-45 (explaining that local actors hoped that the reforms would 
render Latin American states’ criminal justice systems more humane in their 
treatment of criminal defendants and more effective at punishing the misconduct 
of the powerful, among other salutary outcomes). 
174. See id. 
175. Id. at 663-64. 
176. Paul Constance, Verdict Pending, IDB América, Aug. 2003, http://www.iadb.org/ 
idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2361. 
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gentina between 1991-1997, Honduras and Bolivia in 1999, Chile in 2000, Nica-
ragua in 2001, the Dominican Republic in 2002, Peru and Colombia in 2004, 
and the Mexican states of Oaxaca and Chihuahua in 2006.177 
Following the initial criminal procedure reforms in Guatemala and El Sal-
vador, U.S.-promoted criminal procedure reform expanded to the former So-
viet republics.178 Under contracts with USAID, U.S. legal organizations facili-
tated trainings of prosecutors, police, and judges, and participated in revising 
the criminal codes of the newly formed ex-Soviet states.179 In the years to follow, 
U.S. programs began similar initiatives in other regions.180 Along with adver-
sarial reform, these efforts concentrated on reducing the time spent by criminal 
defendants in pre-trial (or preventive) detention, reforming criminal procedure 
codes to better protect the rights of criminal defendants, and expanding me-
chanisms for plea bargaining to increase efficiency in response to dramatic case 
backlogs.181  
In contrast to prior internal security training, USAID highly publicized 
their justice sector reform efforts seeking to inform and involve local publics. 
Comparative law scholar Máximo Langer proposes that Latin American legal 
elites themselves played a major role in directing USAID’s criminal procedure 
reform projects in many countries,182 and that, as a consequence, the revolution 
in Latin American criminal procedure represents a new model of “diffusion 
from the periphery” rather than influence from hegemonic world powers, like 
the United States.183 Still, even Langer notes the extensive U.S. influence in the 
reform processes.184 In any event, without at all diminishing the important con-
 
177. See Langer, supra note 7, at 631. 
178. In 1994, the U.S. Congress recommended expenditure of up to $30 million in the 
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 
(FREEDOM) Support Act and Support for European Democracy (SEED) funds 
for crime control in Eastern Europe. Law enforcement aid programs in Russia re-
ceived $12 million. Participating U.S. agencies included the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the Secret Service. See Press Release, White House Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Crime Assistance Package for the Russian Federation (Sept. 28, 1994). 
179. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-03-058, U.S. Democracy 
Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results 
127 (2003). 
180. See Strang, supra note 9, at 210-11. 
181. See, e.g., Latin America and the Caribbean: Criminal Justice and Legal Reform, 
USAID (Mar. 31, 2010, 11:42 AM), http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_ 
caribbean/democracy/rule/dg_rule4.html. 
182. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 7, at 645-56. 
183. Id. 
184. See id. at 646 (“[A] number of actors from the United States also started working 
in the criminal justice area in Latin America and played a crucial role in the 
spread of these reforms.”); id. at 664 n.248 (noting extensive U.S. influence in re-
formed codes); id. at 667 (Latin American legal elites admired “the American idea 
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tributions of local legal elites and the innovations represented in the specific 
code reforms enacted, it is clear that the U.S. subsidies of, and involvement in, 
the procedural reform process played an indispensable role in pushing many of 
the Latin American reform projects forward.185  
Perhaps most critically for the purposes of the present analysis, USAID’s 
programs paved the way for separate foreign criminal justice reform initiatives 
housed in the U.S. Departments of State and Justice. These initiatives merged 
procedure reform training with U.S. transnational crime control promotion, 
heavily emphasizing U.S. transnational crime priorities. Over the course of the 
1990s, what had begun as a procedurally focused USAID-sponsored reform 
program in Central America in the 1980s, was taken up by a set of Justice and 
State Department programs that fused promotion of transnational crime con-
trol and procedure reform initiatives. Through this merger of U.S. transnational 
crime control promotion efforts with procedure reform initiatives, the State 
and Justice Departments came to wield an increased influence over the shape of 
the reforms, a shift of authority to which I will return in Subsection II.C.4 im-
mediately below. Part III will further address the outcomes of these procedure 
reform efforts, particularly their combined emphasis on the transition of inqui-
sitorial to adversarial criminal justice administration, and the promotion of 
U.S. transnational crime priorities.  
As with transnational crime control, the U.S. commitment to subsidizing 
criminal procedure reform shaped domestic policy in foreign states. It also 
brought about deep involvement of U.S. consultants in foreign internal security 
and justice sector administration, enabling a form of U.S.-dominant global go-
vernance through crime. U.S. subsidies additionally rendered criminal proce-
dure reform an available and relatively less costly manner (at least on first ap-
pearances) of addressing concerns with social disorder, and limits to crime 
control regulatory approaches—by presumably making recipient states’ justice 
sectors more effective.  
The following section explores how USAID’s work was increasingly ec-
lipsed by U.S. State and Justice Department entities. U.S. transnational crime 
control programming came to be integrated with—and in significant ways de-
termined the course of—criminal procedure reform training and implementa-
tion. This institutional integration of transnational crime control programming 
and criminal procedure reform training constitutes the fourth and final com-
ponent of U.S. criminal justice export. 
 
 
of having oral public hearings . . . for the potential democratizing aspects of hav-
ing such hearings, not . . . [so that] Latin American hearings [are] . . . just like U.S. 
American ones.”). 
185. See id. at 646; see also Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin Ameri-
can Justice Programs: Toward an Agenda for Reforming the Reformers, in Beyond 
Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law 309 (Erik 
G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (“The donors, in a sense, created and di-
rected the demand for their programs . . . .”). 
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4. Institutionalize: Transnational Crime and Procedure Reform 
Training 
 
Central to U.S. criminal justice export is an array of U.S. training programs 
aimed at institutionalizing U.S.-promoted reform. These training programs are 
dedicated concurrently to advancing criminal procedure reform (implementing 
U.S.-style adversarial criminal procedure codes) and executing U.S. transna-
tional crime control campaigns (focusing attention on U.S. transnational crime 
priorities).186  
Beginning shortly before the end of the Cold War and with increasing in-
tensity thereafter, USAID’s work was supplemented and in significant part dis-
placed by that of officials from separate programs established under the auspic-
es of the U.S. Departments of State and Justice. These programs included the 
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training 
(OPDAT), the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), and the In-
ternational Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). 
While USAID’s criminal justice sector work continues in concert with the State 
and Justice Departments’ programs, USAID’s projects now principally focus on 
other areas. As criminologist David H. Bayley has documented, much develop-
ment assistance for criminal justice reform “has shifted from USAID . . . to the 
Department of State . . . which sub-contracts the work to specialist law en-
forcement organizations within the government and to private contractors.”187 
Though OPDAT, the ILEAs and ICITAP continue to assist with adversarial 
criminal procedure reform commenced by USAID, this work is coordinated to 
advance OPDAT, the ILEAs, and ICITAP’s respective missions to promote 
 
186. See, e.g., Drug Enforcement and the Rule of Law: Mexico and Colombia: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. (May 18, 2010) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Drug Enforcement and the Rule 
of Law: Mexico and Colombia) (describing the joint focus of Department of Jus-
tice criminal law development programs on implementing adversarial procedure 
reforms and advancing U.S. transnational crime control policy). 
187. See Bayley, supra note 72, at 41. My own review of USAID justice sector programs 
revealed that USAID initiatives focused purely on criminal justice reform are now 
greatly outnumbered by more general judicial education and improved business 
environment offerings. In addition to U.S. State and Justice Departments pro-
grams, a large number of other organizations work on U.S. criminal justice export 
projects, including U.S. government contractors Management Systems Interna-
tional and Checchi  and Company Consulting, as well as the American Bar Asso-
ciation. See Rule of Law Initiative, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/rol/about.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010); Judicial System Strengthening, Checchi and Company 
Consulting, Inc., http://www.checchiconsulting.com (follow “Projects” hyper-
link) (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); Management Systems International, 
http://www.msiworldwide.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). These separate projects 
are not the subject of my analysis in this Article. 
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transnational crime control and prosecutorial efficacy, rather than purely for its 
own sake.188 
In the remainder of this Section, I will specifically consider the work of the 
three primary U.S. government entities—OPDAT, the ILEAs, and ICITAP—
involved in institutionalizing U.S. criminal justice export and fashioning a form 
of U.S.-dominant global governance through crime.  
Since its founding in 1991, OPDAT has encouraged “legislative and justice 
sector reform” and worked to “improv[e] the skills of foreign prosecutors, in-
vestigators, and judges.”189 OPDAT emphasizes seven substantive areas of crime 
as major transnational crime threats: (1) terrorism; (2) organized crime; (3) 
money laundering and asset forfeiture; (4) corruption; (5) narcotics trafficking; 
(6) trafficking in persons; and (7) cybercrime and intellectual property appropr-
iation.190 With attention to these transnational crime priorities, OPDAT consul-
tants—largely U.S. federal prosecutors—train recipient states’ prosecutors, po-
lice investigators, and judges.  
From OPDAT’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., a relatively small su-
pervisory staff develops and oversees OPDAT foreign criminal justice consult-
ing programs that span an expansive geographical territory. OPDAT stations 
teams of U.S. prosecutors, under the supervision of the directorial staff, in nu-
merous foreign locations to implement OPDAT’s projects. OPDAT advertises 
that the field positions are open to current Department of Justice Trial Attor-
 
188. During the 1990s and into 2000, the foreign law enforcement training prohibi-
tions established by section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act were for all intents 
and purposes eliminated by an increasing range of exceptions. New provisions, 
sections 534 and 541, allowed assistance “notwithstanding” the section 660 prohi-
bitions; and President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 71 permitted con-
sulting projects to “rebuild” foreign justice systems as well as to conduct interna-
tional civilian police training. In accordance with their expanded prerogatives, 
U.S. State and Justice Departments’ consultants prioritize promotion of transna-
tional crime control. A declassified summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71 
is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm; see also supra 
note 102 for an explanation of presidential decision directives. 
189. See OPDAT, supra note 3. The “Mission” of OPDAT reads as follows: 
OPDAT was created in the Criminal Division of the Department of Jus-
tice in 1991 in response to the growing threat of international crime. 
OPDAT’s mission is to assist prosecutors and judicial personnel in other 
countries develop and sustain effective criminal justice institutions. 
OPDAT recognizes that international cooperation in the investigation 
and prosecution of criminals and organized crime groups is central to 
countering international crime at its source; and that the efficient and 
fair administration of justice offers the greatest protection from lawless-
ness and support for basic human rights. 
 
190. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93. 
Article - Allegra McLeod - 17 - Final - 2010.12.18 1/6/2011  11:56 AM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 29 : 83 2010 
124 
neys or other Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and in some instances to other expe-
rienced U.S. prosecutors.191  
It is significant in considering the sort of reformed justice system that may 
emerge as a result of U.S. criminal justice export programming that prosecu-
torial perspectives are heavily emphasized, even though concerns about defen-
dants’ rights initially inspired many of the reforms. Internationally deployed 
U.S. prosecutors, referred to by OPDAT as Resident Legal Advisors (RLAs), live 
abroad for at least one year and provide “full-time advice and technical assis-
tance” in ongoing criminal justice reforms.192 When an RLA leaves a foreign 
deployment, he or she is replaced by another U.S. prosecutor. OPDAT also dep-
loys Intermittent Legal Advisors (ILAs). ILAs, like RLAs, are prosecutors often 
already employed by the Department of Justice.193 ILAs conduct discrete assis-
tance programs ranging from a few days to six months, focused upon specific 
criminal justice reforms tethered to transnational crime control.194 OPDAT 
prosecutors not only train other prosecutors but also judges, further extending 
a prosecutorial emphasis in judicial education. OPDAT does not, however, pro-
vide support to public defenders, and relatively little other assistance is pro-
vided to assist the public defense bar, where one meaningfully exists.195 
Also significant is OPDAT’s emphasis on U.S. transnational crime priorities 
over whatever may be a recipient state’s most pressing crime problems at the 
time an OPDAT program commences. In determining where to locate OPDAT 
projects, issues such as the prospect of “lasting and fundamental criminal jus-
tice reform” in the host country or the adequacy of funding and host govern-
ment support are subordinated to advancing U.S. transnational crime control 
priorities.196 Before undertaking a project, as OPDAT’s “Criteria for Project In-
volvement” explains, OPDAT will survey “relevant Department components . . . 
Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Organized Crime and Racketeering Sec-
tion, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, and the Counterterror-
 
191. See, e.g., Resident Legal Advisor for Kenya, Employment and Internship Opportuni-
ties, The United States Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/opdat/emp-opps/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
192. See OPDAT, supra note 3. 
193. See, e.g., Intermittent Legal Advisor for Malaysia, Employment and Internship  
Opportunities, The United States Department of Justice, http://www 
.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/emp-opps/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
194. See id. 
195. One notable exception to this general trend is a public defender training program 
sponsored by USAID in Colombia, the Roberto Camacho Weverberg School of 
Public Defenders, which opened in February 2010 with $165,000 in USAID funds. 
See Press Release, U.S. Embassy, Bogota, U.S. Supports Strengthening of Public 
Defender System in Colombia (Feb. 3, 2010). 
196. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93. 
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ism Section.”197 OPDAT makes clear: The “Department’s interests are primary 
in this process.”198 According to its published internal criteria, the local manife-
stations of crime in recipient countries are not among the criteria considered in 
determining candidates for OPDAT’s justice sector reform programming.199  
In carrying out transnational crime control projects, OPDAT’s work re-
quires expensive financing and enables pervasive surveillant and coercive influ-
ence. As reflected in Figure 1, OPDAT operates field offices in locations across 
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Latin 
America.200  
 
Figure 1: OPDAT Field Offices201 
 
 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. Consequently, while references to “human rights” and other development 
objectives reminiscent of the Law and Development Movement and USAID in-
itiatives abound in OPDAT’s promotional materials, its fundamental agenda is 
plainly determined by U.S. transnational crime priorities. 
200. Even in light of their remarkable geographic reach, OPDAT and related U.S. crim-
inal justice export programs operate at far less cost than do Cold War era foreign 
internal security training deployments, leading Ethan A. Nadelmann to refer pro-
vocatively to such foreign law enforcement consulting as “a form of [U.S.] hege-
mony on the cheap.” See Nadelmann, supra note 22, at 476. 
201. OPDAT Worldwide Activities & Programs-World Map, The United States  
Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/worldact-
programs/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
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Consistent with the Cold War U.S. foreign internal security training model, 
OPDAT works inside foreign prosecutors’ headquarters, and advises and ob-
serves case strategies in ongoing matters of U.S. interest.202 OPDAT’s programs 
involve judicial and prosecutorial skills development, advice on criminal justice 
legislation, and technical assistance in areas such as prosecution guidelines, 
mentoring, and case management—merging procedural training and transna-
tional crime control promotion.203 Among other projects, OPDAT has estab-
lished, equipped, and trained an anti-money laundering task force in Nicaragua 
comprised of Nicaraguan federal prosecutors and investigators;204 conducted 
criminal trial advocacy assistance programs in the Dominican Republic while 
emphasizing U.S. transnational crime priorities;205 conducted trial advocacy 
programs in Baku, Azerbaijan to support implementation of new criminal pro-
cedures, with attention to prosecuting money laundering and human traffick-
ing;206 and provided policy advice in Indonesia on intellectual property protec-
tion through criminal justice enforcement.207 
While USAID’s justice sector reform projects enjoyed the initial support 
and input of local legal advocates, particularly in Latin America,208 OPDAT, the 
ILEAs, and ICITAP operate through a more formal training model, analogous 
to that of Cold War foreign internal security training programs, and similarly 
dominated by U.S. law enforcement officers, particularly federal prosecutors. In 
his study of the Latin American procedure reforms, Professor Langer relates 
anonymous interviewees’ comments that Department of Justice officials were 
 
202. Africa and the Middle East Programs, OPDAT Worldwide Activities & Programs-
World Map, The United States Department of Justice, http:// 
www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/worldact-programs/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) 
(in South Africa, U.S. and South African prosecutors share offices and work to-
gether to combat financial crimes); see also OPDAT Achievements, The United 
States Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/acheive/ 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (in Colombia, OPDAT trains prosecutors and then 
monitors their performance in matters of U.S. interest). 
203. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93. 
204. Latin America and Caribbean Programs, OPDAT Worldwide Activities & Programs-
World Map, The United States Department of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/worldact-programs/ (last visited Sept. 22, 
2010). 
205. See id. 
206. DOJ/OPDAT Eurasia Programs, OPDAT Worldwide Activities & Programs-World 
Map, The United States Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/opdat/worldact-programs/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
207. See DOJ/OPDAT Asia and Pacific Programs, OPDAT Worldwide Activities & Pro-
grams-World Map, The United States Department of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/worldact-programs/ (last visited Sept. 22, 
2010). 
208. See generally Langer, supra note 7. 
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“explicitly exporting the U.S. criminal procedure code.”209 Interviewees related 
that it “was very difficult to imbue the DOJ officials with the vision that the rea-
son they were going overseas was not to export the U.S. model, but rather to let 
the country decide the type of justice they wanted to have.”210 Even DOJ offi-
cials themselves apparently conceded that “DOJ pushed the U.S. model on eve-
rybody and was very insensitive culturally”; but these same officials indicated 
“this has changed and international standards are now the opening bid.”211 Still, 
the underlying agenda of infusing U.S. legal approaches into foreign legal sys-
tems so as to control transnational crime has remained relatively consistent in 
OPDAT’s agenda. The persistence of this agenda is evidenced by high-ranking 
Department of Justice officials’ more recent celebration of OPDAT’s work as a 
great U.S. “export.”212 Serving as a sounding board and resource for countries 
interested in self-initiating distinct criminal justice reforms has elicited less en-
thusiasm.  
OPDAT often works with ICITAP and the ILEAs, focusing on transforming 
foreign criminal justice systems in an integrated process involving the judiciary, 
prosecutors and police.213 The ILEAs opened their first school in 1995 in Budap-
est, Hungary, and subsequently developed additional training schools in Thail-
and, Botswana, El Salvador, Peru, and Roswell, New Mexico.214 The ILEAs’ 
Statement of Purpose relates the origin of the schools’ programs and the scope 
of their ambitions: 
Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly at its 50th Anni-
versary . . . [in] 1995, then-President Clinton called for the establish-
ment of a network of International Law Enforcement Academies 
(ILEAs) throughout the world . . . . Now, years later, the United States 
and participating nations have moved ahead with the establishment of 
ILEAs to serve four regions: Europe, Africa, South America, and 
Asia. . . . The ILEAs serve a broad range of foreign policy and law en-
forcement purposes for the United States and for the world. In addi-
tion to helping protect American citizens and businesses through 
strengthened international cooperation against crime, the ILEAs’ mis-
sion is to buttress democratic governance through the rule of law; en-
hance the functioning of free markets through improved legislation 
 
209. Id. at 658 n.226. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See, e.g., Breuer, supra note 6. 
213. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93. 
214. ILEA Program Overview, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/ 
p/inl/c/crime/ilea/c11243.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter ILEA Pro-
gram Overview]. 
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and law enforcement; and increase social, political, and economic sta-
bility by combating narcotics trafficking and crime.215 
Despite the expression of a broader mandate in its Statement of Purpose 
and elsewhere, the curriculum in Budapest—the first ILEA—focuses primarily 
on transnational crime control.216 ILEA Budapest offers instruction in narcotics, 
counter-terrorism, corruption, money laundering, counterfeit investigations, 
organized crime, nuclear smuggling, community policing, and lastly human 
rights. Separate regional seminars focus on alien smuggling, weapons of mass 
destruction, and the more general category of transnational crime.217  
Again, reflecting deep U.S. involvement in foreign security administration, 
the ILEAs’ international consortium of facilities literally operates within foreign 
internal security structures. For example, the Budapest ILEA sits within the 
Hungarian National Police compound.218 After establishing the Budapest site, 
the ILEAs established a training facility in Southeast Asia, co-sponsored by the 
Royal Thai Government since 1998 and located on Royal Thai Police property 
outside Bangkok. The Bangkok ILEA’s program also heavily emphasizes U.S. 
transnational crime priorities, offering courses on counter-narcotics, computer 
crimes, facility security, and intellectual property.219  
In July 2000, the United States and the government of Botswana signed a 
bilateral agreement to establish an ILEA in Gaborone. The African ILEA is lo-
cated in a building constructed by the government of Botswana for the U.S. 
program “on the grounds of the Botswana National Police College.”220 Also re-
flecting a transnational crime emphasis, the ILEA Gaborone’s curriculum fo-
cuses on drug enforcement, border security, counter-terrorism, anti-
corruption, and financial crimes.221  
The ILEAs operate a graduate facility in Roswell, New Mexico for law en-
forcement personnel who have completed a course at one of the regional ILEAs, 
and two schools in Latin America: one in El Salvador and another in Peru.222 
 
215. ILEA Statement of Purpose, supra note 3. 
216. ILEA Budapest, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/c/ 
crime/ilea/c11279.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); ILEA Program Overview, supra 
note 214. 
217. ILEA Budapest, supra note 216. 
218. Id. 
219. ILEA Bangkok has trained commissioned law enforcement officers, as well as 
prosecutors and members of the judiciary from countries throughout Southeast 
Asia. ILEA Bangkok, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ 
c/crime/ilea/c11280.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
220. ILEA Gaborone, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/c/crime/ 
ilea/c11283.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
221. See id. 
222. See ILEA Roswell, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/ 
inl/c/crime/ilea/c11285.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
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Both Latin American programs are housed within national police facilities, and 
as with the Roswell ILEA, they emphasize terrorism, intellectual property rights, 
financial crimes, environmental crime, human trafficking, and the broader cat-
egory of transnational crime.223  
Thus adapting certain of the institutional strategies of their Cold War insti-
tutional predecessors, the ILEAs physically inhabit the internal security appara-
tuses of recipient states, locating themselves within national police facilities. 
They also promote transnational crime control as a means to improve social, 
economic, and political stability in recipient locations. According to the U.S. 
Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Program 
and Budget Guide for 2008, the five ILEAs “have trained over 28,000 officials 
from over 75 countries . . . .”224 These classes of law enforcement officials learn 
to define transnational crime in terms provided by U.S. instructors and to apply 
crime control techniques to address those particular transnational concerns.  
The ILEAs work alongside the Department of Justice’s International Crim-
inal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP has nineteen 
field offices, the largest of which employs sixty-one persons. The offices focus 
on a range of issues including cybercrime, intellectual property crime, human 
trafficking, and counter-terrorism.225 Figure 2 below reflects the global scope of 
ICITAP’s programs. 
 
 
223. See ILEA List of Courses, supra note 118. Those eligible to become students at the 
ILEAs in Latin America include police, prosecutors, and judicial officials from 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Belize, the 
Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. 
224. U.S. Dep’t of State, International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: FY 2008 
Program & Budget Guide 13 (2007). 
225. International Criminal Investigative Training Program (ICITAP), 
About ICITAP (2010) [hereinafter About ICITAP]. 
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Figure 2: ICITAP Program Locations226 
 
ICITAP, in contrast to OPDAT and the ILEAs, was established before the 
end of the Cold War. The U.S. Congress created ICITAP in 1985 as an explicit 
exception, section 534(b)(3), to the section 660 prohibition on foreign internal 
security assistance.227 The Department of Justice then directed ICITAP to focus 
on foreign law enforcement reform, with an initial mission to train police forces 
in Latin America, as a response to multiple crises in the region involving human 
rights abuses by security forces, discussed briefly in Subsection II.A.1. ICITAP 
aims to foster international and regional cooperation on transnational crime, 
“in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.”228 And, in-
deed, its programs primarily emphasize narcotics, money laundering, cyber-
crime, human trafficking, and intellectual property appropriation.229 
ICITAP too exercises pervasive influence, commands expensive financing, 
and is significantly involved in foreign internal security administration, but un-
like OPDAT and the ILEAs, ICITAP also concentrates its consulting projects on 
prison administration, among other projects.230 In fiscal year 2010, ICITAP 
 
226. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ICITAP Field Offices & Funded Countries  
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/programs/icitap-world-
map.pdf. 
227. Bayley, supra note 72, at 39. 
228. See About ICITAP, supra note 225. 
229. See id. 
230. Perhaps reflecting the eclipse of ICITAP’s initial Cold War human rights mandate 
by transnational crime control and other prerogatives, ICITAP was implicated, 
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trained over 29,000 foreign participants, in over 1,000 training events, in its 
thirty-eight country programs worldwide.231 Through these initiatives, ICITAP 
provides technical advice, training, mentoring, and equipment donation to for-
eign law enforcement agencies, and establishes internships for foreign officers 
with U.S. criminal justice offices.232 ICITAP’s programs have included the crea-
tion of a law enforcement task force in Bosnia-Herzegovina to target narcotics, 
human trafficking, terrorism, and money laundering.233 In Indonesia, ICITAP 
helped develop criminal investigative capacity in cybercrime and intellectual 
property rights violations.234  
In summary, the scope of the criminal justice export work of OPDAT, the 
ILEAs, and ICITAP has surpassed that of USAID’s criminal justice consultants, 
covering an ever more expansive geographic territory. OPDAT, the ILEAs, and 
ICITAP work in every major region, merging the work of criminal procedure 
reform and transnational crime control, emphasizing U.S. transnational crime 
priorities.235 U.S. criminal justice export draws upon models of Cold War for-
 
albeit indirectly, in the scandal of the tortures in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., A Review of ICITAP’s 
Screening Procedures for Contractors Sent to Iraq as Correctional 
Advisors 1 (2005) (“Following public reports of . . . prisoner abuse by military 
personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Senator Charles Schumer wrote a let-
ter to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), dated June 2, 2004, in which he 
raised concerns that four of the corrections advisors ICITAP had sent to Iraq . . . 
were unqualified because of allegations of serious misconduct when they served as 
high-level, state corrections officials in the United States.”). The resulting investi-
gation did not find evidence that the advisers from ICITAP were directly con-
nected to prisoner abuse. But see Investigation of Misconduct and Mismanagement 
at ICITAP, OPDAT, and Criminal Division’s Office of Administration: Hearing be-
fore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 6 (2000) (statement of Rep. Henry 
J. Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary) (“Senior managers at the 
Department . . . engaged in potentially criminal misconduct and serious misma-
nagement, and other senior managers paid no attention to the problems. . . . 
[S]ecurity violations, visa fraud, financial mismanagement, abuse of the travel 
rules and regulations for self-aggrandizement, preselection and favoritism for 
some employees, were the norm in . . . [ICITAP and OPDAT].”). 
231. See About ICITAP, supra note 225. 
232. See id. ICITAP often subcontracts its work to specialist law-enforcement organi-
zations within the U.S. government and to private contractors. Bayley, supra 
note 72, at 39. 
233. See  ICITAP Europe and Eurasia, The United States Department of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/ (follow “Our Programs” hyperlink) (last 
visisted Sept. 22, 2010) . 
234. See ICITAP Asia and Pacific, The United States Department of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/programs/asia-pacific.html (follow “Our 
Programs” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
235. See ILEA Program Overview, supra note 214. 
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eign internal security training to facilitate a post-Cold War regime of global go-
vernance through crime: inhabiting foreign internal security structures, framing 
global social concerns in terms of transnational crime, and providing incentives 
to foreign states to address U.S. priorities through criminal justice frameworks. 
The following Part will explore the range of other effects associated with U.S. 
criminal justice export and with this regime of U.S.-dominant global crime-
governance, paying particular attention to the most heavily targeted states in 
Central America.  
 
III. U.S. Criminal Justice Export on the Ground 
 
What outcomes has U.S. criminal justice export—through the fusion of 
transnational crime control and criminal procedure reform—generated in reci-
pient states? There are at least four sources that may offer insight into this ques-
tion: (1) internal U.S. program reports; (2) performance of reformed criminal 
justice mechanisms; (3) documented public perceptions in recipient states; and 
(4) comparative results with respect to particular measures (e.g., interpersonal 
violence) in similarly situated locations, some of which have been recipients of 
U.S. criminal justice export and others of which have not. In this Part, I will be-
gin to consider three of these sources, leaving the last approach to this inquiry 
for future work.236  
First, as to the internal evaluative reports of U.S. criminal justice export 
programs themselves: These accounts do not illuminate much regarding the ac-
tual effects associated with U.S. criminal justice export projects, as will be dem-
onstrated in the following Section. The authors of these reports have sought to 
structure evaluative measures so as to ensure “success,” setting readily achieva-
ble but ultimately superficial training or legal reform targets. Internal evaluators 
also purport to tie particular criminal justice reforms to lofty goals such as in-
creased stability or security, where no persuasive empirical connections are es-
tablished. So although programs’ self-evaluations routinely reflect at least short-
term achievement of self-defined goals, they illuminate little regarding the ac-
tual outcomes in affected states.  
 
236. In order to reach further definitive conclusions about the outcomes generated by 
U.S. criminal justice export, both within the United States and abroad, the fourth 
noted evaluative approach might also assess the impact of U.S. criminal justice 
export programs as against the counterfactual scenario in which such programs 
did not exist. An inquiry along these lines might commence with a comparative 
empirical analysis of relevantly similar locations, some of which had been reci-
pients of particular forms of U.S. criminal justice aid and others of which had not. 
Given the numerous and complex variables involved, it would not be easy to carry 
out an analysis of this kind, and a systematic comparative inquiry of this sort is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the preceding analysis has contributed 
an account of the relevant processes and reforms to which to attend in any such 
subsequent studies. 
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A second source that may elucidate the effects of U.S. criminal justice ex-
port on the ground is the performance of the reformed criminal justice me-
chanisms. The question in this context is whether the reformed mechanisms are 
functioning as intended. Do these mechanisms—reformed adversarial criminal 
procedures, for example—function such that they actually have the potential to 
generate the intended results: improved fairness, efficiency, or social stability? 
On this point, independent case studies reveal that in Central America, the re-
gion most intensively targeted for U.S. criminal justice export, U.S.-promoted 
reforms have had decidedly mixed effects. While prosecutors’ offices and budg-
ets have dramatically increased, the relevant procedural mechanisms are often 
sufficiently dysfunctional as to be unable to generate many of the anticipated 
positive outcomes. These accounts also suggest that U.S.-promoted initiatives 
may in fact exacerbate pre-existing problems by diverting scarce resources to 
criminal procedure reforms that fail to function as promised. These failings oc-
cur both in the U.S. context—as elaborated by criminal law scholar William 
Stuntz and legal historian John Langbein—and abroad. This may in turn sug-
gest that there is no procedural quick fix, whether adversarial, inquisitorial, or 
otherwise, for profound social problems that manifest in the criminal justice 
context. 
A third point of interest in evaluating U.S. criminal justice export is the do-
cumented public perception of U.S. criminal justice export in recipient states. 
Public perceptions reflect whether the relevant programs have succeeded politi-
cally, through democratic indigenization of the proposed reforms or otherwise. 
On this point, research institutes, scholars, activists, and investigative journal-
ists in recipient states have drawn public attention to illiberal and anti-
democratic law enforcement activity and a mounting crime control crisis, left 
largely unaddressed by U.S. transnational crime and procedure reform initia-
tives. U.S. criminal justice export has directed recipient state attention to U.S. 
transnational crime priorities—intellectual property appropriation, terrorism, 
and cybercrime, among them—that are orthogonal to local concerns in many 
recipient locations. In certain recipient states there is acute awareness and even 
outrage about the ways in which U.S. criminal justice export violates principles 
of self-determination and democracy; it induces foreign states, along the lines 
examined in Part II, to attend to U.S. priorities at the possible expense of the 
domestic public interest.237 Distinct from the impression conveyed by the rele-
vant programs’ internal evaluative reports, the court of public opinion largely 
tells a story of failure.238 
 
237. See, e.g., Velásquez, supra note 5, at 246 (“[T]his reform [in Colombia] was not 
the product of free debate of ideas or criminal-political discussion on the part of 
academics and legislators, instead it emerged as a product of the open and de-
clared imposition on the part of foreign powers that, in the middle of a modern 
crusade that they have put on the scene, now they also determine when, how, and 
on what subjects we should legislate in our countries.”). 
238. See infra Section III.B. To claim that U.S.-promoted reforms have failed in certain 
ways is not to mark their failure against “success” in other locations. As compara-
Article - Allegra McLeod - 17 - Final - 2010.12.18 1/6/2011  11:56 AM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 29 : 83 2010 
134 
In the remaining pages of this Part, I will consider the first three of the four 
above-noted sources of evidence regarding the outcomes generated by U.S. 
criminal justice export. The following Subsections will first address U.S. pro-
grams’ unrevealing reports of success, and then discuss competing accounts of 
criminal justice landscapes associated with U.S. projects in Central America, 
with particular attention to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The analy-
sis in this Part demonstrates that U.S. criminal justice export has encountered 
serious difficulties (parallel in several respects to problems prevalent in U.S. 
criminal justice systems), and remains disconnected from addressing the harms 
most disruptive to recipient locations.  
 
A. Unrevealing Measures 
 
While internal evaluations of U.S. criminal justice export routinely result in 
reported “successes,” these do not reference the sort of criteria that one might 
imagine would indicate achievement of relevant goals, such as reduced violence, 
improved prosperity, increased investment in light of greater stability, or an 
overall more efficient and humane operation of criminal justice systems. Ra-
ther, two misleading evaluative strategies predominate. On the one hand, U.S. 
programs routinely limit the ends to be achieved to narrow but realizable train-
ing targets; targets that effectively serve as both the means and ends of the pro-
posed reforms. This ensures that the limited targets identified will be achieved, 
and hence the programs are deemed “successful,” even if such “success” comes 
irrespective of articulating or striving to achieve independent goals. On the oth-
er hand, where means are not substituted for ends, program advocates identify 
grandiose aspirations, but provide no account of how the specific recommend-
ed reforms relate to the desired goals. Instead, they equate any potentially posi-
tive step toward these goals, no matter how speculative, as caused by U.S. initia-
tives.239  
If all that is demanded of U.S. criminal justice export is that it is a stop-gap 
measure of U.S.-dominant global governance, then misleading evaluations may 
be beside the point in the short-term, or even conducive to global governance 
in their confirmation of “success” (since the evaluations will always be positive 
 
tive law scholar Jorge L. Esquirol demonstrates in his analysis of the fiction of 
“failure” of law reform in Latin America, the so-called failures attributed as pecu-
liar to Latin America by many are in fact “characteristic weaknesses of liberal 
law.” See Esquirol, supra note 34, at 82-83. The question is not whether recipient 
states are uniquely prone to legal institutional disappointment, but whether U.S.-
promoted criminal justice and transnational crime control models constitute the 
approaches best suited to addressing the particular harms most devastating to re-
cipient locations (as well as to parts of the United States). 
239. See generally Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Practitioners (Carnegie Papers Rule of Law Series, Paper No. 55, 
2005) (discussing the broader problem of means-ends substitutions in rule of law 
promotion). 
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as they will always meet the means-end test). However, if the achievement of 
purported crime-reducing and stability-enhancing outcomes matter, and if the 
legitimacy of the relevant programs is of interest, then these evaluative limita-
tions are immediately significant. 
 
1. Substituting Means for Ends 
 
The first of these misleading evaluative trends originates in a specific insti-
tutional assessment model associated with corporate management theory, de-
scribed in that literature as “Managing for Results.” Managing for results was 
designed to be a comprehensive management method of focusing “missions, 
goals, and objectives” in the private sector to improve efficiency, but increasing-
ly this model has been applied to U.S. government bodies.240 Managing for re-
sults “establishes the accomplishment of . . . goals and objectives as the primary 
endeavor for the organization, and provides a systematic method for carrying 
out that endeavor.”241 This framework generally has three levels: strategic “ob-
jectives,” each of which connects downward to several “intermediate out-
comes,” which in turn correspond to several “performance indicators.”242 Ob-
jectives are to be selected in a manner that generates regularly measured results 
and outcomes that satisfy the objectives, creating strong incentives to concep-
tualize and define limited, readily achievable objectives.243 The managing for re-
sults approach tends to encourage organizations to adopt a limited institutional 
vision and to assess organizational performance without regard for the broader 
range of programs’ possible effects. This trend is reflected in the work of a range 
of rule of law development projects, and as leading democracy promotion ex-
pert Thomas Carothers reveals: “[W]hen faced with strict, narrow criteria for 
success, aid officers . . . design projects that will produce quantifiable results ra-
 
240. See Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting for Governments, About SEA 
Reporting: Performance Management, Government Accounting Standards 
Board (Oct. 7, 2010 1:50 AM) http://www.seagov.org/aboutpmg/ 
managing_for_results.shtml; see also Peter F. Drucker, Managing for Re-
sults: Economic Tasks and Risk Taking Decisions (1964) (discussing the im-
plementation of results-based management). 
241. Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting, supra note 240 (“[Managing for 
results] requires the (1) establishment of performance measures, (2) use, and (3) 
reporting of those measures; so that management, elected officials and the public 
can assess the degree of success the organization had in accomplishing its mission, 
goals, and objectives.”). 
242. See id. 
243. Legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in the early 1990s effectively mandated 
that federal government agencies adapt a managing for results framework, requir-
ing that all such agencies devise a mission statement and a set of achievable objec-
tives against which to regularly assess and report performance. See, e.g., Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.). 
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ther than ones that are actually needed. . . [T]he indicators become established 
and are taken to constitute the set of accepted outcomes . . . . The evaluation tail 
begins to wag the program dog.”244 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, the managing for results evaluative method 
adopted by most U.S. criminal justice export programs, including OPDAT, the 
ILEAs, and ICITAP, reflects precise and narrow definitions of strategic objec-
tives, intended results, and limited indicators of success. These indicators are 
largely disconnected from broader goals.  
OPDAT, for example, has identified the following four “International Jus-
tice Sector Development Goals:”  
GOAL 1: Develop the capacity of partner nations to combat terrorism 
and terrorist financing;  
GOAL 2: Assist partner countries to control their domestic violent 
crime problems, including organized crime, before they are exported to 
the United States;  
GOAL 3: Assist countries with inadequate laws to address trafficking in 
persons, especially women and children; and  
GOAL 4: Provide development assistance to countries seeking to im-
prove the effectiveness of their justice sector in a manner consistent 
with the rule of law.245  
To assess whether OPDAT is meeting these four goals, OPDAT relies upon 
eight factors as “Measures of Performance:”  
(1) Structural Reform;  
(2) Host Government Commitment;  
(3) Positive Impact on Operational Interests of the Justice Depart-
ment;  
(4) Decrease in Reported Human Rights Violations;  
(5) Quantitative and Qualitative Improvements in the Administration 
of Justice;  
(6) Judicial Independence;  
(7) Integration and Balance; and  
(8) Tools for Criminal Justice Reform.246 
OPDAT’s selection of these factors to measure progress toward its goals en-
tails, predictably, a means-ends substitution because several of OPDAT’s 
“measures” are properly considered “means” rather than “measures” of per-
formance. For instance, OPDAT defines Measure 1—“Structural Reform”—as 
 
244. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve 294 
(1999). 
245. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93. 
246. See id. 
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the development and implementation in the recipient country of standards of 
conduct for justice sector workers and disciplinary mechanisms. OPDAT de-
fines Measure 8—“Tools for Criminal Justice Reform”—as “penal codes, codes 
of procedure and investigative techniques.” These same codes and standards of 
conduct are central means by which OPDAT intends to achieve its ultimate 
goals (e.g., Goal 4—improve the effectiveness of recipient states’ respective jus-
tice sectors).  
Structural reform itself cannot measure the embrace of the “rule of law” or 
capacity “to combat terrorism” or to “control . . . crime problems.” Instead, to 
function as a persuasive measure, there must be some account of a causal rela-
tionship that connects any particular structural reform (existence of a prosecu-
torial code of conduct or disciplinary mechanism) and the desired outcome 
(presumably internalization of or compliance with the code). In relying upon 
these means of reform—basically, revised codes—as measures of performance 
with respect to broader goals of crime reduction, OPDAT substitutes means for 
ultimate ends. In so doing, OPDAT ensures at least partially favorable program 
assessment on the terms of the managing for results model since success is 
guaranteed merely by OPDAT’s promotion of revised codes (among the core 
means by which OPDAT aims to accomplish its work). 
Some of OPDAT’s other measures would more appropriately be classified 
as predicate factors ensured prior to even beginning a project. Measure 2—Host 
Government Commitment—is simultaneously noted by OPDAT as a criterion 
that must be in place before undertaking a project. According to OPDAT’s Stra-
tegic Plan, the “concrete assurances of support and ‘buy-in’” of recipient coun-
try officials “are a condition precedent to OPDAT participation at any level of 
assistance.”247 Similarly, Measure 3—Positive Impact on Operational Interests 
of the Department of Justice—is a prerequisite for OPDAT involvement. 
OPDAT will not even undertake a project unless it will have a “positive impact 
on [the] operational interests of [the Department of Justice].”248 
Virtually all of OPDAT’s reported “achievements” define success in refer-
ence to trainings conducted,249 though it is entirely unclear how these trainings 
resulted in achievement of any of OPDAT’s afore-noted goals. Further, “suc-
cess” according to four of OPDAT’s performance measures (1, 2, 3, and 8) is as-
 
247. See id. 
248. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93. (“OPDAT must be prepared to articulate 
the reasons why it is in the interest of the Department to undertake a criminal jus-
tice assistance project in a particular country.”). 
249. See OPDAT Achievements, supra note 202 (noting among its “achievements” an 
Anti-Gangs training workshop in El Salvador for officials from El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Chile and Mexico to teach them how to manage gang violence within the 
criminal justice sector). 
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sured simply by virtue of OPDAT undertaking a training or code promotion 
project.250  
The ILEAs likewise identify a set of ambitious goals—“enhanc[ing] the 
functioning of free markets through improved . . . law enforcement,” and “in-
creas[ing] social, political, and economic stability by combating narcotics traf-
ficking and crime.”251 But the ILEAs then measure success in reference to the 
number of trainings administered and students graduated rather than in terms 
of other more substantive criteria such as crime reduction, improved police-
civilian relationships, quality of life improvements in neighborhoods to which 
officers return, or even measurable changes in officers’ attitudes regarding cor-
ruption. Specifically, the ILEAs use students’ “critiques and end-of-session re-
ports by instructors and program coordinators” following trainings as assess-
ment tools.252 No explanation is provided as to how the ILEAs’ training will 
promote rule of law or crime reduction: Success is predicated instead on mea-
suring the “professional development of graduates” which has yielded, accord-
ing to the ILEAs, “very positive results.”253 If students and instructors favorably 
review trainings in which they participated, then the ILEAs claim success vis-à-
vis their goals, even if, as may be the case, the trainings do not even impact, or 
may in fact undermine, social stability. 
ICITAP’s evaluative framework similarly reflects a limited set of objectives 
designed to ensure “success.” ICITAP’s goals are to “develop professional and 
transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat 
corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.”254 
Central to the realization of these goals is building or “improving” foreign Law 
Enforcement Training Academies. Yet, the indicated objectives for Law En-
forcement Training Academies involve only the means of administering or 
planning to administer training.255 Similarly, with regard to ICITAP’s Organiza-
tional Management and Leadership program, which ICITAP refers to as “Phase 
II” of its program, objectives refer to various trainings without noting any inde-
 
250. There remain four additional OPDAT measures that are neither predicate factors 
for involvement nor means substituted as ends: decrease in rights violations, 
quantitative and qualitative improvements to the administration of justice, judi-
cial independence, and integration and balance. The next Subsection will demon-
strate how these latter four measurement factors are invoked in a distinct, yet still 
misleading manner. 
251. See ILEA Statement of Purpose, supra note 3. 
252. See ILEA Program Overview, supra note 214 (discussing ILEA Development and 
Evaluation). 
253. See id. 
254. See About ICITAP, supra note 225. 
255. See Our Expertise, The United States Department of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/expertise/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
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pendent outcomes the programs seek to bring about.256 Where ICITAP articu-
lates independent rule of law promotion goals, no explanation is provided of 
how trainings or donated technology facilitate ICITAP’s claims to “eliminate 
human rights violations by the police” or “better coordinate with the communi-
ty to create a sense of security, trust, and partnership.”257  
It is not merely that measures of success are inadequate because they indi-
cate that a sub-goal is achieved without reference to whether larger goals have 
been achieved. Larger goals, of course, are often difficult to measure, and sub-
goal measurement may be the only way to glean whether the larger goal has 
been advanced. The chief flaw in U.S. criminal justice export’s internal evalua-
tions is that the relevant sub-goals and measures—such as quantity of trainings 
conducted and student end-of-session teaching evaluations—bear no meaning-
ful relationship whatsoever to the larger, less readily measurable goals of in-
creased stability and security. The sub-goals are not defensible proxies for the 
larger, less measurable goals (or at least have not yet been so defended), but in-
stead reflect a convenient substitution of means for ends. 
 
2. Demanding Leaps of Faith 
 
Where meaningful independent goals are established by U.S. criminal jus-
tice export programs, that is, when means such as training targets are not subs-
tituted for ends, the programs’ claims regarding their success in meeting these 
goals are unduly optimistic: Claims of success take for granted the value of U.S. 
efforts and confuse weak associations of any possibly positive developments with 
their work as generated by U.S. programs. U.S. criminal justice export programs 
recommend a set of practices: adversarial procedures, lengthy prison-based pu-
nishment, plea bargaining as a tool to reduce system backlogs, and above all, 
specific transnational crime priorities. Nevertheless, no reasoned theory ex-
plains how these practices will concretely benefit recipient states or other inter-
ests. Rather, U.S. criminal justice export programs merely assume these practic-
es will bring about stability, reduced crime, and economic growth. In some 
contexts, this adherence to U.S. priorities manifests as an unwavering allegiance 
without consideration of actual effects on the ground, and wholly lacks any em-
pirically or theoretically substantiated causal story connecting U.S.-promoted 
reforms to pledged outcomes. In other instances, the confusion of weak associa-
tion with causation functions as support for uncritical attributions of success to 
U.S. projects—demanding, in effect, leaps of faith.  
 
256. See Phase II: Development of Procedures, Curriculum, and Management Training, 
The United States Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/icitap/expertise/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (on file with author). 
257. See Transition to Democratic Policing Development Program Impact Measures, The 
United States Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/icitap/expertise/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (on file with author). 
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OPDAT’s “performance measures” not already analyzed in terms of means-
ends substitutions serve as a telling example. Once again, these performance 
measures include: Decrease in Reported Human Rights Violations (Measure 4); 
Quantitative and Qualitative Improvements in the Administration of Justice 
(Measure 5); Judicial Independence (Measure 6); and Integration and Balance 
(Measure 7). OPDAT defines each of these four evaluative categories broadly 
enough to permit any potentially positive justice sector development within a 
recipient country to fall within one evaluative category or another. As an exam-
ple, a “reduction in the average length of time arrestees spend in pretrial deten-
tion” over a period would suffice to confirm a “decrease in reported human 
rights violations,” Measure 4. On these terms, a decrease in human rights viola-
tions would include a reduction in the length of time between the issuance of 
criminal charges and conviction, even if the time reduction reflected shortcut-
ting criminal procedure protections rather than administering fair or effective 
new procedures. Correspondingly, Measure 5—Quantitative and Qualitative 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice; Measure 6—Judicial Indepen-
dence; and Measure 7—Integration and Balance, are defined so broadly as to 
encompass any change in the recipient country, ranging from reduced duplica-
tion of functions, to increased prosecutions or incarcerations.258 But increased 
prosecutions or incarcerations might actually reflect human rights violations 
through police or prosecutorial overreaching, or increased criminal conduct, 
rather than the administration of justice gains OPDAT’s measure implies.  
Of equal significance, no explanation is provided as to why any indicator 
should be attributed to OPDAT’s prosecutor training, its draft model codes, or 
its other projects. Nonetheless, in its reports of “Achievements,” OPDAT rou-
tinely takes credit for what it construes to be improvements resulting from its 
programs. One recent “achievement” for OPDAT involved the sentencing on 
January 18, 2008, by a three-judge panel of the Serbian Belgrade District Court 
of four “organized crime gang members” to “more than 460 years imprison-
ment.” OPDAT reports that this “verdict is one of the most important orga-
nized crime verdicts rendered in Serbia, and represents how strong both the 
Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office and the Organized Crime Court have be-
come with Department of Justice Assistance.”259 While there may be a weak asso-
ciation between OPDAT’s presence in the country and an enhanced sentence, 
no causal account is offered to attribute such sentences to OPDAT’s projects or 
even to overall justice sector improvements. Still, OPDAT operates on this as-
sumption, and confuses imprecise associations of this sort with causal connec-
tions to reinforce its assumption.260 
 
258. See OPDAT Strategic Plan, supra note 93 (noting factors to be taken into account 
in developing performance indicators for specific Program Proposals and Work 
Plans). 
259. See OPDAT Achievements, supra note 202 (emphasis added). 
260. U.S. foreign criminal justice consultants are not unlike other rule of law promo-
ters in this regard. Carothers has also drawn attention to this tendency to mistake 
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ICITAP also claims that its programs have a major role in promoting de-
mocracy and controlling transnational crime, but fails to explain why any posi-
tive transformations in host countries should be credited to ICITAP’s work. 
ICITAP instead confuses the association between ICITAP presence and all in-
country developments as a causal connection and proceeds to label its work 
successful.261 ICITAP’s Project Overview for El Salvador, for example, claims 
that the performance of El Salvador’s police forces “has improved dramatically 
since the initiation of ICITAP’s efforts.”262 ICITAP notes the “steady reduction 
of crime in most categories and the striking reduction in the number of kid-
nappings, armed robberies and truck hijackings.”263 No explanation is provided 
that links truck hijacking or robbery reduction to ICITAP’s trainings. And, crit-
ically, the reduction in crime reported by ICITAP bolsters ICITAP’s credibility 
by excluding, as the following Section illustrates, the many categories in which 
crime actually increased.  
The self-evaluation of U.S. criminal justice export thus fluctuates between 
substituting training targets for independent ends and the unreasoned attribu-
tion of any possibly positive development to U.S. projects. Where outcomes are 
irrefutably disappointing, U.S. criminal justice exporters call for patience, with 
faith that the tide will turn.264 More than a decade and a half into a nearly glob-
al-scale program of extensive U.S. transnational crime control and procedure 
reform training, the Department of Justice reports that transnational crime is 
increasing rather than decreasing (though as discussed in Section II.B, it is un-
clear whether reliable measures of the incidence of transnational crime even ex-
ist). In light of presumed increases in transnational crime, the Department con-
cludes that further trainings will continue to respond to and repel 
“transnational criminal trends.”265 As a consequence of unjustified faith in U.S.-
 
general correlations with causation in the context of USAID democracy promo-
tion work: “[I]f something good happens in the domain in which an aid project is 
working, the aid provider automatically takes credit for it whether or not there is 
any plausible causal link.” Carothers, supra note 244, at 295. 
261. See About Icitap, supra note 225. 
262. See ICITAP El Salvador, The United States Department of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/expertise/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
263. See id. 
264. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Int’l Operations 
of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 69 (1994) (statement of John J. 
Coleman, Assistant Administrator for Operations of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency) (“[W]e need to be somewhat patient. . . . [W]e cannot expect miracles 
overnight. [Colombia has] changed their legal system. They have basically 
adopted a U.S.-based or U.S. style legal system in Colombia. Despite the great fru-
strations . . . we are making some progress on some levels from time to time.”). 
265. See United States Department of Justice: Criminal Division Office of Overseas Prose-
cutorial Development Assistance Training, Embassy of the United States, Mos-
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promoted reforms and misleading evaluative approaches, the actual effects of 
U.S. criminal justice export are little understood by program advocates. These 
misleading evaluative approaches may bolster self-perceived successes, but they 
reveal almost nothing about the programs’ impact on crime and development 
in affected regions or in the United States. 
 
B. Harms Associated With U.S.-Sponsored Reforms 
 
 In contrast to U.S. programs’ self-evaluations, case studies conducted by 
independent researchers suggest that U.S.-sponsored projects divert much-
needed resources to U.S. priorities, with little attention to the problems most 
concerning to recipient states. Once in place, the reforms are believed to be as-
sociated with a set of unanticipated adverse consequences, including law en-
forcement abuses and persistent procedural dysfunction, not entirely unlike the 
disfunction in the United States noted by legal commentators. A detailed study 
of the outcome of any particular program, and of the counter-factual scenario 
in which such a program had not occurred is beyond the scope of this Article 
and will be reserved for future work. The remainder of this Section will survey 
the available evidence—from independent research institute case studies, com-
parative law scholarship, investigative journalists’ accounts, and local indepen-
dent non-governmental organizations’ reports—concerning justice sector de-
velopments associated with U.S. initiatives. The analysis will focus primarily on 
U.S. initiatives in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, states that have been 
especially heavily targeted by U.S. programs.  
 
1. Incongruous Crime Control Concerns 
 
There is a dramatic incongruity between U.S. transnational crime priorities 
and the most pressing social and crime problems in recipient states in Central 
America. Over the post-Cold War period of intensive U.S. criminal justice ex-
port (emphasizing transnational crime including intellectual property appropr-
iation, cybercrime, financial crime, unauthorized migration, and terrorism), in-
terpersonal violence has been a severe source of harm and instability in affected 
states. Murder, theft, and rape are commonplace in the most intensely targeted 
Central American countries.266 Poverty and joblessness are also rampant; migra-
tion flows and market restructuring have decreased opportunities for rural em-
ployment relative to urban employment.267 Slums in cities around outsourced 
 
cow, Russia, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/justice.html (last visisted Oct. 28, 
2010) (“With transnational crime increasing at exponential rates, the challenge of 
providing such assistance becomes an ever greater component of DOJ’s interna-
tional obligations.”). 
266. Ayres, supra note 29; U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Crime & Instability: 
Case Studies of Transnational Threats 24, fig.17 (2010). 
267. See id. at 12-13. 
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manufacturing zones have metastasized and crime and gang activity are most 
severe in these locations.268 Economic instability and extensive unemployment 
have led many, men in particular, to turn to criminalized economic activity and 
gangs to support themselves and their families.269 The associated violence has 
had a distressing effect, disproportionately harming the poor.270 The murder 
rate per 100,000 inhabitants in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is persis-
tently high by world standards. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and 
Crime, between 2003 and 2008, El Salvador’s murder rate ranged from 51 to 64 
murders per 100,000 inhabitants.271 During the same period, Guatemala’s mur-
der rate increased from 34 to 61 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.272 Honduras 
likewise experienced an increase of 31 to 49 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.273 
By stark contrast, over these same years, the murder and non-negligent man-
slaughter rate in the United States remained constant at around 5 per 100,000 
inhabitants.274 Despite the gravity and extent of interpersonal violence in these 
recipient locations, these forms of harm are not among the crime priorities em-
phasized by U.S. criminal justice exporters in their work in Central American 
states or elsewhere.  
 
268. See Clare Ribando, Cong. Research Serv. RS 22141, Gangs in Central 
America, CRS-1 (2005); Dennis Rodgers, Slum Wars of the 21st Century: The New 
Geography of Conflict in Central America 7 (Crisis States Research Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 10, 2007). 
269. See Rodgers, supra note 268. Migration flows from Central America have also led 
to increased reliance on remittances from rich northern countries, driving ever 
greater numbers of people to hinge their hopes for a better economic future on 
immigration. In El Salvador, for example, remittances from Salvadorans working 
in the United States to their families in El Salvador are approximately three billion 
dollars per year, a major proportion of the country’s GDP, with 22.3% of families 
in El Salvador living off of such remittances. See Marcela Sanchez, Putting Remit-
tances to Work, Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 2006, at A19; Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, Background Note: El Salvador, U.S. Department of State, (July 14, 
2010), http://www.state. gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm. 
270. See Alessandra Heinemann & Dorte Verner, Crime and Violence in Development: A 
Literature Review of Latin America and the Caribbean 7 (World Bank Pol’y Re-
search, Working Paper No. 4041, 2006) (“[T]he more assets an individual or 
household can acquire and the better they manage them, the less vulnerable they 
are.”) (citation omitted); see also Mano Dura Wave Increases Repression Against 
Crime in Central America, COAV Newsroom (May 8, 2006), http://www. 
comunidadesegura.org/?q=en/node/11786. 
271. See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, supra note 266, at 24, fig.17. 
272. See id. 
273. See id. 
274. See U.S. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States  
by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1989-2008, tbl.1 (2008), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius2008/data/table_01.html. 
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As interpersonal violence plagues recipient states, what have been program 
participants’ reactions to the notable incongruities between U.S. transnational 
crime priorities and local concerns? In one case, Francisco Gómez, a mid-level 
Salvadoran police officer who attended the El Salvador ILEA’s “Law Enforce-
ment Management Development Program” in early 2007, reported that though 
his experience at the ILEA was positive, it focused in significant part on coun-
ter-terrorism: “This [terrorism] isn’t a problem in El Salvador,” Gómez ex-
plained, “but I suppose it could be.”275  
In other instances, the focus on certain categories of transnational crime 
may direct recipient states’ resources to “crime” problems that are not as ob-
vious candidates for criminalization as U.S. policy would suggest, or for which 
there is at least reason to believe developing states would weigh the pros and 
cons differently.276 As one example, street vending of bootleg CDs, DVDs, ciga-
rettes, and other products constitutes a significant sector of the urban economy 
in many states and provides employment to thousands of individuals; the U.S. 
transnational crime control model, though, views this as intellectual property 
crime.277 Criminalizing the livelihood of street vendors imposes a significant 
hardship upon affected persons in recipient states, particularly when under-
employment is widespread.278   
Even narcotics crime, though undoubtedly an area of criminalized market 
activity disruptive to the social stability of many if not all places where it occurs, 
might generate quite different policing or regulatory strategies were developing 
states’ (and under-developed regions of rich states’) interests to take center 
stage. Despite the harms caused by narco-trafficking in much of the world, it is 
widely recognized that “the production, sale, and export of narcotics are closely 
interwoven with the economies and political systems of many countries. These 
 
275. Wes Enzinna, Another SOA? A U.S. Police Academy in El Salvador Worries Critics, 
NACLA Rep. on the Americas, March/April 2008, at 5, 8 (2008). 
276. See, e.g., Carolyn Nordstrom, Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power 
in the Contemporary World 3-24 (2007) (examining the dependence of a sub-
set of citizens in developing countries on criminalized markets for survival). 
277. See Landlords To Face Fines for Ignoring Sales of Fakes, Bangkok Post, Sept. 21, 
2009; Piracy Clash in Patpong: Vendors Lash Out with Sticks, Bottles, Stones, Bang-
kok Post (Thailand), May 8, 2009 (reporting organized resistance to intellectual 
property crime enforcement against street vendors and explaining that Thai offi-
cials declared a “crack down on intellectual property piracy after the United States 
put Thailand on special watchlist of nations that fail to crack down on copyright 
and patent violations”); Afifah Kusumadara, Faculty of Law, Brawijaya Univ., In-
donesia, Problems of Enforcing Intellectual Property Laws in Indonesia, Presenta-
tion Before the International Association of Law Schools Conference 203  
(Apr. 10-12, 2008), available at http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/business/ 
MasterBookletHamburg2.pdf. 
278. Cybercrime is another U.S. priority emphasized in foreign training curricula, 
though it is not among the most pressing forms of social disorder plaguing many 
recipient countries.  
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activities are an important source of foreign exchange, income and employment 
in the affected states.”279 Consequently, the U.S. approach of confronting nar-
cotics—primarily through criminalization, eradication, arrests, prosecutions, 
and lengthy incarceration—may not be the approach best suited for recipient 
states in which at least certain narcotics, if regulated otherwise, might provide a 
vehicle for greater economic and political stability.  
Of separate concern, once recipient states adopt anti-terrorism or intellec-
tual property legislation, when recipient states’ crime problems and U.S. priori-
ties are incongruous, U.S. transnational crime initiatives may be directed 
against vulnerable and non-threatening targets, at times to politically repressive 
ends. For example, among the first defendants charged under El Salvador’s new 
terrorism provisions, adopted at U.S. urging in 2006, were political protestors 
challenging the privatization of water resources. These protestors faced up to 
sixty years of imprisonment under the law.280 Following the implementation of 
U.S.-promoted intellectual property crime measures in El Salvador, former Sal-
vadoran President Saca identified Salvadoran street vendors selling pirated 
goods as criminals, and he proclaimed that “[the vendors] are terrorists—the 
correct word is ‘terrorist’ . . . . Anyone who sells something illegal on the streets 
must go to prison.”281  
This trend is not unique to El Salvador or to Central America: In Russia, 
the government has used intellectual property crime legislation as a means to 
target civil society advocates.282 Election monitoring, human rights, environ-
mental, and immigrants’ rights groups have been pursued for “software piracy,” 
and even where prosecutions were ultimately dropped, government officials 
seized organizations’ reports and computers.283  
Although the precise motivations of repressive domestic “tough on crime” 
policies of this sort may be difficult to disentangle, U.S. criminal justice export 
has ushered in a new realm of criminality where recipient states may act in ways 
in excess of, or unintended by, the legislation’s architects. The impact of the as-
sociated increase in incarceration rates in El Salvador further burdened the 
 
279. Rensselaer W. Lee, III, Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview, in Trans-
national Crime in the Americas, supra note 107, at 1, 5. 
280. Salvadorans Face Terror Charges for Opposing Water Privatization, Democracy 
Now (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.democracynow.org/2007/8/1/salvadorans_face_ 
terror_charges_for_opposing. 
281. Wes Enzinna, Global War on Terrorism: El Salvador, The Nation, Dec. 31, 2007 
(quoting President Saca’s remarks at a press conference at which Enzinna was 
present). 
282. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia Uses Microsoft To Suppress Dissent, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
11, 2010, at A1. 
283. See id. 
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country’s crisis-stricken prisons, which are designed for 7,000 inmates but as of 
September 2007 held 17,000 inmates.284 
While no causal connection should be assumed between the proliferation 
of U.S. criminal justice export programs and regional crime trends, during the 
relevant period, at least in Central America, interpersonal violence and destabi-
lizing street crime have consistently plagued the region.285 Further, in El Salva-
dor and elsewhere, U.S.-promoted transnational crime laws have been invoked 
to repressive ends, rather than to counter threats to citizens’ well-being. And, in 
fact, substantial criminal justice assistance provided over a twenty-year span 
may have exacerbated persistent interpersonal harms by diverting resources 
from exploring context-sensitive approaches to containing violence and inse-
curity to U.S.-promoted transnational crime control and criminal procedure 
reform.  
 
2. The Costs of New Criminal Procedures  
 
In the face of persistent crime waves in states throughout Latin America, a 
central component of U.S.-sponsored criminal justice reform has been the 
transformation of previously inquisitorial justice systems to adversarial, U.S.-
style models. As explained in Subsection II.C.3, over the course of the 1990s and 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, many Latin American, ex-Soviet, and 
other states carried out variations of inquisitorial to adversarial procedure re-
forms with U.S. support.286 Roughly one billion dollars from outside the region 
has been spent to facilitate these reforms, with funds coming from the U.S. gov-
ernment, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development institutions, other 
 
284. Will Grant, El Salvador Addresses Jail Crisis, BBC News, Sept. 14, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6994399.stm; see also Michael J. Trebil-
cock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Chart-
ing the Fragile Path of Progress 175-78 (2008) (“Overcrowding in Latin 
American prisons has reached unprecedented levels . . . . Peru’s new anti-
terrorism measures coincided with a 50% increase in prison populations.”); Mark 
Ungar, Prisons and Politics in Contemporary Latin America, 24 Hum. Rts. Q. 909, 
910 (2003) (“The most obvious cause of Latin America’s inhumane prison condi-
tions and violence is an incarceration rate that sharply increased throughout the 
region in the 1990s.”). 
285. Lisa Bhansali & Christina Biebesheimer, Measuring the Impact of Criminal Justice 
Reform in Latin America, in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search 
of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 301, 309(“[C]rime and violence rates have not 
decreased noticeably after reforms were implemented. Crime rates, however, are 
notoriously volatile according to factors that have little to do with the criminal 
justice system (the unemployment rate, for example), and so tracing the impact of 
criminal process reforms on these rates is very difficult.”). 
286. See Langer, supra note 7. 
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donor nations, and the U.N. Development Program.287 This procedural reform 
wave was in part organized by USAID and is now implemented with the assis-
tance of OPDAT, the ILEAs, and ICITAP. With the increased role of OPDAT, 
the ILEAs, and ICITAP, procedure reform projects continue to be a key part, 
though a lesser proportional focus of U.S. criminal justice export. But despite 
OPDAT, the ILEAs, and ICITAP’s preferred emphasis on transnational crime 
control, the procedural reforms continue to impact the administration of jus-
tice in Latin America (and other regions) in significant respects, and with em-
phatically mixed results.  
What are the initial indications about the outcomes of the U.S.-sponsored 
Latin American wave of procedure reforms? While results vary from country to 
country, there is a general perception that in large part the reforms have fallen 
short in delivering promised outcomes, and that the procedures are often una-
ble to function as intended.288 In some states, delays in processing cases persist 
or have worsened.289 In others, plea bargaining eclipsed almost entirely the goal 
 
287. See Peter DeShazo & Juan Enrique Vargas, Judicial Reform in Latin 
America: An Assessment 3 (2006). 
288. See Mauricio Duce J., La Oralización de Las Etapas Previas al Debate: La 
Experiencia de la Ciudad de Quetzaltenango en Guatemala [Movement 
to Oral Legal Proceedings: The Experience of the City of Quetzalte-
nango in Guatemala] 2-3 (2006) (author translation) (reporting a general per-
ception that the reform in Guatemala has not been able to bring about the 
changes and results that were expected); id. at 15 (noting that the overall record is 
disappointing, having failed to meet the high expectations created, largely due to 
poorly functioning new systems that are slow, lack transparency, pay scant atten-
tion to users, and lack independence in decisionmaking); id. at 13 (reporting on 
Hammergren’s conclusions that there is general disappointment with the progress 
of judicial reform in the region; a need for better statistics and empirical evidence 
to track the issues; and a lingering question about why reform is needed as there 
seems to be little public demand for it). 
289. See Centro de Estudios Penales de El Salvador (CESPES) [Center of Pen-
al Studies of El Salvador], Seguimiento de la Reforma Procesal Penal en 
El Salvador [Monitoring Report on the Penal Reform Process of El Sal-
vador] 91 (2002-2003) (author translation) (reporting on delays in El Salvador in 
the face of high caseloads and inadequate models of case processing in the new 
system on the part of the judiciary, police and prosecutors); Edgardo Amaya 
Cóbar & Ricardo Vladimir Montoya, Centro de Estudios de Justicia de 
las Américas (CEJA) [Center for Justice Studies in the Americas], In-
forme de Seguimiento de la Reforma Procesal Penal en Honduras [Mo-
niitoring Report on the Penal Reform Process in Honduras] 52 (2004) 
(author translation) (noting large numbers of open cases in Honduras pending 
for more than a year in the investigatory and prosecutorial stages, reflecting a ten-
dency for cases to accumulate); DeShazo & Vargas, supra note 287, at 10-11 (re-
porting on a case study of the Guatemalan reform presented by Luis R. Ramírez, 
director of the Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guate-
mala: “Only a very small percentage of cases go to trial and even major cases sel-
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of promoting oral adversarial trials.290 While in Guatemala reforms were ac-
companied by a decrease in pre-trial or preventive detention (one of the inspi-
rations for the reforms), in El Salvador preventive detention increased.291 A re-
curring problem across the board is a lack of adequate data and transparent 
access to information about the reformed systems in order to evaluate in a ri-
gorous manner the specific impacts of reformed procedures.292 
In Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and elsewhere in Latin America, 
procedure reforms have been met with hostility as the public perceives robust 
procedures to be driving crime problems, even though there is no indication 
that this is the case.293 As a consequence, there is a “backlash” against the re-
forms, with recurring attempts to render substantive criminal law more puni-
 
dom reach the stage of a verdict. . . . Rising levels of criminal activity . . . put 
enormous pressure on a legal system that is unprepared to respond.”). 
290. See DeShazo & Vargas, supra note 287, at 9-10 (reporting on case study of Co-
lombian reform presented by Eduardo Bertoni, Director of the Due Process Law 
Foundation, and Alfredo Fuentes, judicial program director of the Andean Com-
munity: “Although the efficiency of [Colombian] prosecutors is unquestionable 
in terms of resolving criminal cases in a shorter time . . . this has resulted from 
plea-bargaining agreements or from extracting faster confessions, as well as from 
receiving the lion’s share of the overall judicial budget”). 
291. See Mauricio Duce J. et al., The Impact of Criminal Procedure Reform on 
the Use of Pretrial Detention in Latin America 27 (2009) (reporting a sig-
nificant increase in the number of unsentenced inmates per 100,000 inhabitants 
in El Salvador); Bhansali & Biebesheimer, supra note 285, at 313-14. 
292. See, e.g., Ileana Arduino, La Reforma Procesal Penal en Nicaragua [The 
Penal Reform Process in Nicaragua] 32 (2006) (author translation) (report-
ing an absence of adequate data collection to enable measurement, evaluation, 
and improvement of reformed systems). 
293. See Duce J. et al., supra note 291, at 31-32 (“The media has encouraged the idea 
that crime is on the rise . . . . Some have argued that the increase in defendants’ 
rights has facilitated the commission of crimes. . . . The responses have been 
stronger in the political arena. . . . In July 2007, a Chilean politician accused su-
pervisory judges of ‘being responsible for the climate of insecurity in which we 
live.’ Another argued that ‘some judges sentences are making them a danger to 
society and that is unacceptable.’”); see also Constance, supra note 176 (“In addi-
tion to facing resistance from judicial professionals, in many countries the new 
criminal procedures have been attacked by the media. The most frequent criticism 
is that new criminal procedures place too much emphasis on protecting the rights 
of suspects and not enough on punishing criminals. In countries that have seen a 
rise in violent crime in recent years, this claim tends to find a receptive audience, 
even where there is no clear connection between crime rates and the treatment of 
suspects. . . . [T]his combination of poorly implemented procedural changes and 
intense public anger over rising crime could have dire consequences. The reform 
is in danger of failing in several countries . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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tive, and to curtail procedural protections, to counter what is perceived as pro-
cedural laxity.294  
Regardless of the inter-state variation with other results, one outcome is 
constant throughout the region: Pursuant to U.S.-sponsored reforms, criminal 
justice spending has soared and prosecutors’ offices have markedly expanded. 
Crime-governance is an ever more prevalent feature of public discourse.295 The 
use of imprisonment, itself costly, has also increased in the new systems.296 De-
velopment experts indicate that to render procedures fully effective will “cost 
considerably more everywhere.”297 
Interestingly, the justice sector dysfunction identified in case studies of the 
most heavily targeted Central American states is roughly analogous in several 
important respects to the pathologies in U.S. criminal law administration dis-
cussed above in Subsection II.C.3, and elaborated by leading criminal and com-
parative law scholars.298 As in the United States, recipient state justice sectors 
are overburdened by frequent recourse to criminal prosecution to maintain so-
cial order.299 Large-scale invocation of criminal procedure protections would 
result in dramatic backlogs, so procedural shortcuts have become commonplace 
lest considerable delays occur.300 Where backlogs remain, there is pressure to 
resolve more cases through plea bargaining.301 Because crime-governance do-
 
294. See Margaret Popkin, Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the 
Rule of Law in El Salvador 241 (2000); Bhansali & Biebesheimer, supra note 
285, at 305. 
295. See DeShazo & Vargas, supra note 287, at 16 (“Governments in the region have 
been spending proportionately more on the justice sectors since the reform 
process began . . . although the quality of services rendered does not always track 
with increases in budgets.”); Duce J., supra note 288, at 3 (noting that the Guate-
malan prosecutorial budget increased five-fold between 1995 and 2005 from $11 
million to $56 million, and that the number of prosecutors increased from 24 in 
1991 to 847 in 2004); Cristián Riego & Juan Enrique Vargas, Criminal Jus-
tice Reform in Latin America: Successes and Difficulties 4 (2003) (“No-
wadays, for one reason or another, the political agenda in our countries seems al-
ways to be awaiting the most recent decision by some judge in a criminal trial.”). 
296. Duce J. et al., supra note 291, at 30. 
297. See Linn A. Hammergren, Envisioning Reform: Improving Judicial Per-
formance in Latin America 52 (2007). 
298. See Langbein, supra note 18; Stuntz, supra note 16. 
299. See Popkin, supra note 294, at 190; Constance, supra note 176. 
300. In Colombia, from January 2005 to July 2007, there were 35,124 people sentenced 
after plea bargaining compared to only 693 sentenced after trial. This suggests that 
less than 2% of cases went to trial. See Fiscalía General de la Nación [Na-
tional Attorney General], Boletín Estadístico No. 20, Segundo Trime-
stre 2007 [Statistical Newsletter, Second Trimester 2007], at 32 (2007) 
(author translation). 
301. See, e.g., id. 
Article - Allegra McLeod - 17 - Final - 2010.12.18 1/6/2011  11:56 AM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 29 : 83 2010 
150 
minates the political field, procedural protections are decried by politicians and 
in mainstream media outlets as too expansive. There is substantial public hostil-
ity to robust criminal procedure rights, even though these rights are seldom en-
joyed in practice, and judicial enforcement of criminal procedure rights has re-
sulted in hostility to the judiciary.302 The ensuing perception of an overly robust 
set of criminal procedure protections impeding effective crime control results in 
a ratcheting up of criminal law enforcement to avoid the mistaken perception 
that criminal defendants are unduly benefiting from judicially enforced proce-
dural protections.303 The result, as Langbein pointedly exposes in the U.S. con-
text, is a compromised system where defendants’ rights remain severely cur-
tailed, prosecutorial coercion is routine, and the public often suffers from a lack 
of transparent access to reliable information about serious crime.304  
Seeking to inform and improve the reform processes, in the late 1990s an 
international agency staffed largely with Latin American experts, the Justice 
Studies Center of the Americas (CEJA in Spanish), was created to facilitate em-
pirical research. CEJA’s research aims to assist in remedying what have come to 
be widely perceived failures of U.S.-sponsored justice sector reforms in Latin 
American states.305 In concert with local experts, CEJA has subsequently orga-
nized a series of careful studies of reforms across the region. The range of wor-
ries these analyses reveal again run parallel, at least in part, to defects prevalent 
in U.S. criminal law administration.  
One major problem is the lack of available resources to support the robust 
and effective functioning of adversarial criminal procedures. This resource defi-
ciency is especially acute when considering the indispensable component of an 
 
302. See Duce J. et al., supra note 291, at 31-32; Riego & Vargas, supra note 295, at 18-
22; Constance, supra note 176. 
303. See Constance, supra note 176; Stuntz, supra note 16, at 4 (noting a similar though 
not identical dynamic in the U.S.). 
304. See Langbein, supra note 18, at 124. 
305. CEJA’s headquarters are located in Santiago, Chile and its members are the active 
member states of the Organization of American States. CEJA’s purpose is de-
scribed as follows: “Over the past twenty years, nearly every country in the region 
has promoted wide-reaching judicial reform programs. . . . However, there is a 
widespread perception that the reforms have not produced all of the desired re-
sults. Furthermore, systematic and in-depth evaluations of the changes that have 
been implemented thus far have not been undertaken, which has caused the 
strong impulse that originally accompanied the reforms to wane. JSCA [CEJA] 
was created in order to reverse this process and provide new impetus for the mod-
ernization of justice systems in the region.” Justice Studies Center of the Americas 
(Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Americas), AIDS Security &  
Conflict Research Hub, http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/justice-studies-center-
of-the-americas-centro-de-estudios-de-justicia-de-las-americas/institution_view 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2010). 
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effective public defender service in an adversarial criminal procedure regime.306 
Under inquisitorial systems, investigative and much prosecutorial authority 
rests with the judge, who is also responsible for securing compliance with pre-
scribed criminal procedures. Under an adversarial system, the judge in a crimi-
nal trial acts as a neutral arbiter, in principle moderating the vigorous challenge 
by the defense of the case put on by the prosecutor. Because shifting investiga-
tive authority from the judge to the prosecutor simultaneously increases the au-
thority and discretion of prosecutors and prompts judges to take less active re-
sponsibility for procedural compliance, public defender offices require 
additional funding and staff under an adversarial system. Otherwise, the re-
forms will result in serious potential unfairness for those facing criminal 
charges.307 Support for public defender programs, however, “has been limited—
despite the human rights rationale for reforms.”308  
Defense lawyers “have not received the necessary training to carry out effec-
tive questioning of the evidence . . . nor have they had access to successful me-
thods for defining defense strategies.”309 Defenders also “spend most of their 
time in court, and thus have limited opportunities to prepare cases . . . [and to] 
develop autonomous investigations. This problem has not been treated in depth 
as part of the reform process.”310 Even in terms of actual personnel capacity, de-
fense counsel is significantly outnumbered. As of 2003 in El Salvador, there 
were 0.3 defense lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants, as compared with 9.9 prosecu-
tors per 100,000 inhabitants.311 In Guatemala in 2004, there were 137 public de-
fenders as compared to 847 prosecutors.312 Underfunding indigent criminal de-
fense systems is also, of course, characteristic of U.S. criminal justice 
 
306. Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 284, at 253 (reporting high caseloads and in-
sufficient funding in most Latin American states that undertook procedural re-
forms with the exception of Costa Rica: “Local officials have been reluctant to pay 
public defender salaries, leaving USAID to fill this role. When USAID funding has 
ended, salaries have sometimes not been paid.”); see id. at 260 (reporting a similar 
pattern in Romania and Estonia where defense lawyers only meet clients in the 
courtroom, may not talk to clients at all, and occasionally state in defense “I leave 
this decision to the court.” (citing Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court 
Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, 9 Eur. L.J. 294 (2003))). 
307. See id. at 260. 
308. Esquirol, supra note 34, at 108 (“[T]he accusatorial model assumes that the sides 
be evenly matched. The change thus requires creating or strengthening public de-
fenders, not only prosecutors.”). 
309. Riego & Vargas, supra note 295, at 17; see also CESPES, supra note 289, at 55 (re-
porting on obstacles in El Salvador to the delivery of adequate defense services). 
310. See Riego & Vargas, supra note 295, at 17. 
311. See id. at 16 tbl.3. 
312. Duce J. et al., supra note 291, at 3. 
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administration,313 but the relative poverty of most recipient states and the un-
familiarity of new procedural configurations render the inadequacy of public 
criminal defense particularly severe.  
Other reported problems arise with the expanded purview of prosecutors, 
who must now conduct investigations previously facilitated by judges. But 
prosecutors are too underfunded and understaffed to assume this additional 
responsibility, even though their offices have swelled. Prosecutorial services are 
often unable to devote energies to learning how to navigate the new adversarial 
system and at the same time proficiently manage large caseloads.314  
A predicament unique to states transitioning from inquisitorial to adver-
sarial systems involves resentment on the part of institutional actors of the 
change in their role under the adversarial system. This resistence is not entirely 
surprising. For instance, whereas previously police investigators had interacted 
directly with the investigating judge, they are now viewed as subordinate to pro-
secutorial demands.315 Police resentment has resulted in officers’ non-
compliance in some cases, producing further systemic dysfunction.316 In El Sal-
vador and Guatemala, state officials have failed to bring detained criminal de-
fendants to trial. This leads to the further detention of individuals awaiting de-
termination of their respective cases due to their “failure to appear,” caused by 
the state’s inability to competently administrate the new procedures (as the new 
process requires the physical presence of the accused).317  
While there are certainly inefficiencies and fairness problems inherent in 
inquisitorial criminal procedures as well as adversary ones, the U.S.-sponsored 
 
313. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the 
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994). 
314. See Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 284, at 157-58 (“Unregulated, outdated le-
gal education produces a weak pool of potential prosecutors, while low salaries 
and low esteem surrounding the prosecutorial office have made it difficult to at-
tract experienced lawyers . . . . In order to appease demanding private parties, and 
in the absence of instructions to act otherwise, prosecutors agree to leave open 
cases that might otherwise have been quickly closed; as a result, resources are 
wasted and . . . prosecutorial caseloads grow to unmanageable levels.”); see also 
Bhansali & Biebesheimer, supra note 285, at 308 (exploring the tremendous chal-
lenge of requiring lawyers and judges trained under one procedural system to ad-
just to another very different one). 
315. See Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 284, at 157-58 (describing the frustration of 
police and prosecutors with changes in their roles and relationships engendered 
by procedural reforms in El Salvador); see also DeShazo & Vargas, supra note 
287, at 16 (“[R]emnants of the old inquisitional systems still persist, with consi-
derable recalcitrance on the part of judges, lawyers, law professors, and judicial 
administrative authorities to give them up . . . .”). 
316. See DeShazo & Vargas, supra note 287, at 16. 
317. Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 284, at 157-58; see also Riego & Vargas, supra 
note 295, at 21-22 (discussing courts’ issues with scheduling and failures to ap-
pear). 
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criminal procedural changes have not typically rendered many Latin American 
recipient countries’ justice sectors better able to manage problems associated 
with interpersonal violence and related crimes. The lack of available data on the 
performance of reformed systems and barriers to transparent access further 
hinders monitoring and feedback to improve institutional functioning.318 Thus 
while pre-existing prosecutorial approaches have been partially dismantled as a 
result of U.S.-sponsored reforms, the new structures do not function as in-
tended.  
In Chile, one of the few states where U.S.-style adversarial criminal justice 
reforms are heralded as successful, another peculiar feature (again reminiscent 
of the U.S. crime governance landscape) has become apparent.319 Effective im-
plementation of new procedures in Chile has required vast increases in criminal 
justice spending, which brought about the creation of new jails and more effi-
cient and transparent administration of justice. Yet, alongside enhanced crimi-
nal justice spending, and though victimization surveys indicate crime in Chile 
has remained constant, fear of crime is greater than before. While in 2003, 
44.6% of Chileans believed crime had worsened in their neighborhood in the 
previous twelve months, in 2007 that number increased noticeably to 53.5%.320 
One conclusion that might be drawn from this is that even where sufficiently 
sizeable resources are devoted to render adversarial criminal procedures “effec-
tive,” a heavy emphasis on criminal justice institution-building and crime con-
trol (or crime governance) still carries certain risks, among them, a citizen body 
that suffers from an outsized fear of crime.  
Comparative law scholar Jorge L. Esquirol suggests further reasons why, 
even if U.S.-sponsored procedural reforms achieve a certain degree of “success,” 
such procedures may entail policy implications that are open to contestation, 
though these tradeoffs remain unacknowledged by U.S. criminal justice expor-
ters: “More prosecutions and speedier trials mean a different balance between 
civil liberties and powers of enforcement,” and the reconfigured procedures 
“may not eliminate any of the problems involving [judicial] discretion, simply 
shifting it to a different [prosecutorial] office or to officials with different 
titles.”321 As has been noted in the U.S. context, Esquirol points out that 
“[p]rosecutorial misconduct is especially problematic because it is difficult to 
redress.”322 Irrespective of the legal institutional idolatry manifest at times in the 
 
318. See, e.g., CESPES, supra note 289, at 56 (reporting on the refusal of key institutions 
in El Salvador to provide relevant data on justice sector operations, and lack of 
transparent access where data does exist). 
319. See DeShazo & Vargas, supra note 287, at 4 (“The Chilean example is broadly 
viewed as the most successful in the region, given its ambitious scope, the re-
sources dedicated to the task, and the political commitment to see it through.”). 
320. Gideon Long, Is Chile Imagining a Crime Wave?, Time, Oct. 22, 2008, http:// 
www.time.com/ time/world/article/0,8599,1852730,00.html. 
321. Esquirol, supra note 34, at 109. 
322. Id. at 108. 
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promotion of adversariality, oral adversarial proceedings do not possess any 
magical power to quash abuses of power. The first oral trial held in Guatemala 
in 1994 provides a case in point, as there “were charges of bribes being paid to 
everyone, from the witnesses, to the judge and the prosecutor.”323 According to 
a foreign prosecutor working in Guatemala at the time: “[d]espite the dubious 
quality of the evidence, the state needed and thus got a conviction to prove the 
new system worked.”324 All the same, U.S. criminal justice exporters seize upon 
particular legal models and assign great hopes to adversarial procedures, exces-
sively relying on particular procedures to bring about change, the precise con-
tours of which remain relatively unexamined.325 
In the many Latin American states where reformed procedures have proven 
substantially dysfunctional, vast sums of scarce public funds are devoted to 
criminal justice sectors that struggle to perform effectively, as those states con-
front pervasive street crime and widespread resource deprivation. One lesson 
this ought to drive home is that there may be no procedural quick fix, adver-
sarial or otherwise, to remedy the ills that accompany overreliance on criminal 
law administration as a proxy for addressing head-on entrenched social con-
cerns. 
 
3. Democratic and Demotic Harms 
 
In this context of often-dysfunctional procedural reforms and devastating 
interpersonal violence in multiple Central American states, U.S. criminal justice 
export reflects a profound democratic deficit. Although there is no record of 
organized opposition to the establishment of ILEAs or related U.S. criminal jus-
tice programming in many foreign locations, the creation of the Central Ameri-
can ILEA prompted significant public anger and resistance. This resistance sug-
gests that whatever other effects may be associated with the Central American 
ILEA, it is viewed by at least some vocal citizens as a form of legal imperialism 
and as unwelcome there.326  
Plans to establish a Central American ILEA began in 1997 in San Jose, Costa 
Rica, where President Clinton and the presidents of five Central American 
countries agreed to develop an ILEA for Latin America and the Caribbean.327 
Although the U.S. academy was to be located in Costa Rica, those plans en-
 
323. Hammergren, supra note 297, at 36. 
324. Id. at 36 n.28. 
325. See id. at 38-53 (discussing two weaknesses in U.S.-sponsored reform projects: ex-
cessive faith in the power of legal reform to create positive behavior changes and 
an excessive reliance on the perceived benefits of adversarial proceedings). 
326. See Enzinna, supra note 275, at 6. 
327. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), ILEA Back-
ground Information (June 12, 2006), http://www.cispes.org/index.php?option= 
com_content &task=view&id=77&Itemid=29. 
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countered public opposition by a coalition of Costa Rican citizen advocacy or-
ganizations. Eventually, the Costa Rican government acceded to the citizens’ 
coalition, leading the United States to look elsewhere for a host country.328 U.S. 
government officials then chose El Salvador, though at the time of the first pub-
lic announcement of the ILEA San Salvador in 2005 by U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. instruction of Latin American police, prosecutors and 
judges was already scheduled to commence.329 Within a short time, the ILEA El 
Salvador generated organized opposition.330 
Opposition to the Central American ILEA rests on three main grounds. 
First, ILEA opponents point to the lack of transparency and accountability as-
sociated with the ILEA program, as reflected in the ILEA’s refusal to release 
complete course materials. The ILEA has only been willing to release general 
public information regarding course topics and certain lesson plans, such as the 
ILEA’s courses on transnational crime.331 ILEA administrators also refuse, for 
unspecified security reasons, to release lists of students who have attended the 
ILEA to facilitate human rights monitoring.332  
The second ground of opposition to the Central American ILEA relates to 
feared continuity between U.S. Cold War internal security training in Latin 
America and the ILEA’s trainings. This potential continuity is particularly dis-
turbing to Salvadorans in light of the training that the United States provided to 
persons later implicated in the death squads that devastated El Salvador during 
the civil war of 1980-1992.333 Despite efforts of ILEA administrators to alleviate 
these concerns by hiring human rights instructors to provide two days of in-
struction over the six-week course term, ILEA opponents remain unconvinced 
that the risks of law enforcement excesses are sufficiently contained.334 This may 
be due in part to the aforementioned lack of transparency. 
The third basis of opposition relates to the incorporation of human rights 
instruction: Advocates argue that such incorporation risks legitimizing the vio-
lent abuses of law enforcement in the region without fundamentally altering the 
crime control emphasis of the curriculum.335 According to Latin Americanist 
 
328. See id. 
329. See id. 
330. Enzinna, supra note 275, at 7. 
331. See id. at 8. 
332. See id. 
333. See id. 
334. See, e.g., Wes Enzinna, Response to Getting Personal: Cuéllar and the ILEA, 41 
NACLA Rep. on the Americas, https://nacla.org/node/4802 (last visited Oct. 7, 
2010). 
335. See Enzinna, supra note 275, at 12; see also David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of 
Virtue: Reassessing Humanitarianism 25 (2004) (“[Human rights discourse] 
may, in some contexts, place the human rights movement in the uncomfortable 
position of legitimating more injustice than it eliminates.”). 
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Wes Enzinna, who has studied and written about the ILEA in El Salvador, the 
incorporation of human rights terminology and personnel on the part of the 
ILEA “exemplifies a new and troubling facet of U.S. intervention in the region: 
the co-optation of human rights discourse and the paid involvement of local 
human rights authorities in U.S.-sponsored police and military training pro-
grams.”336 The Salvadoran government’s Human Rights Ombudswoman Bea-
trice de Carrillo has expressed apprehension along these lines: that the ILEA will 
render El Salvador’s National Civilian Police force, from which a majority of 
ILEA’s Salvadoran students are drawn, more “professional and elegant in its use 
of violence.”337 These concerns find initial support in a 2006 report authored by 
de Carrillo that relates that 40% of abuse complaints submitted to the Salvado-
ran Office of Human Rights involved the National Civilian Police.338 In short, 
ILEA opponents fear that a partnership between human rights advocates and 
law enforcement personnel will result in a form of human rights credentialing 
that may protect rights violators; that the human rights advocates will subse-
quently be less vigilant monitors of abuses; and that human rights training will 
obscure what are presumed, rightly or wrongly, to be repressive features of the 
ILEA’s agenda. 
Ultimately, in their attention to the lack of transparency and accountability 
of the Central American ILEA, the ILEA opponents in El Salvador make appar-
ent that U.S. criminal justice export may be experienced as the foreign imposi-
tion of a transnational crime control program, resonating for local publics with 
prior catastrophic forms of U.S. intervention. This is a resonance unlikely to 
subside in light of the similarities in institutional architecture between ILEA 
and Cold War foreign internal security training, and the profound harms and 
painful memories the similarities conjure.339  
Reinforcing some of the ILEA opponents’ concerns are broader trends re-
lating to law enforcement excesses, and even vigilantism, in parts of Central 
America over the period of active U.S. involvement in law enforcement train-
ing. During the time frame of intensified U.S. criminal justice export, between 
 
336. See Enzinna, supra note 334. 
337. See Enzinna, supra note 275, at 11 (quoting Beatrice de Carrillo). 
338. A report by the Salvadoran Archbishop’s Legal Aid and Human Rights Defense 
Office recounts that ten murders were allegedly perpetrated by National Civilian 
Police officers in 2006 and includes reports of tortures. See Tutela Legal del 
Arzobispado [Legal Guardians of the Archdiocese], La Violencia Homi-
cida y Otros Patrones de Grave Afectación a los Derechos Humanos en 
El Salvador: Informe de las Investigaciones y Lucha Contra la Impuni-
dad [Homicidal Violence and other Patterns Gravely Affecting Human 
Rights in El Salvador, Report on the Investigations and Struggle 
Against Impunity Carried Out] (2007) (translated by Committee in Solidarity 
with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)), available at http://www.cispes.org/ 
documents/lobbyingdocs/Tutela Legal reportENGLISH.pdf. 
339. See supra Sections II.A, II.C. 
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the mid-1990s to the present, “mano dura” (literally “hard hand”) law enforce-
ment policies have swept the region. With an increased emphasis on crime con-
trol, under-resourced police forces frequently require military reinforcements—
mano dura policies then combine military personnel and police officers in joint 
law enforcement operations, and encourage an array of “tough on crime” 
measures that can be highly repressive.340  
Much of the ire about rising crime and law enforcement excesses is directed 
against suspected gang members. These gang members are frequently deportees 
from the United States—a demographic outsourced from the U.S. criminal jus-
tice system.341 Salvadoran Deputy Citizens’ Security Minister Rodrigo Ávila re-
ports that “deportations are at the core of the [gang] problem.”342 Arrest sweeps 
of young men with tattoos have saturated domestic criminal justice systems in 
multiple Central American states. According to Eric Henriquez, a former M-18 
gang member in East Los Angeles who was deported to El Salvador in 1998, de-
portees associated with U.S. gangs are often left with few options other than 
joining a related gang in El Salvador when they are returned. Henriquez, who 
directs a group called Homies Unidos that provides rehabilitation services to 
former gang members, explains that many criminal deportees arrive in El Sal-
vador speaking little Spanish and without money, support, or job prospects: 
“Typically, they’ve spent most of their lives in the States. So they are dumped in 
a foreign culture and immediately face discrimination . . . . Employers see . . . 
tattoos and close their doors. . . . So you look for any network you can find.”343 
Some of the support for mano dura policies directed against youth gangs comes 
from the top levels of recipient countries’ governments with the tacit if not di-
rect backing of the United States. However, local communities and citizens’ 
groups whose well-being is severely undermined by street crime also occasional-
 
340. See Ungar, supra note 284, at 925 (“Although national and state officials elected 
recently in Latin America span the political and ideological spectrum, the most 
common element of electoral success has been an anti-crime stance. In November 
2001, Honduras elected as President a businessman who ran on a New York ‘zero 
tolerance’ anti-crime platform. . . . In 1999, Buenos Aires governor Carlos Ruckauf 
was elected on the platform of ‘Bullets for Murderers.’”). 
341. The increasing incidence of criminal deportations in the 1990s can be traced to 
major changes to U.S. immigration laws included in two pieces of legislation 
passed in 1996: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Between 1998 and 
2004, nearly 12,000 Salvadorans with criminal records were deported to El Salva-
dor from the United States. Many of these individuals had been associated with 
Salvadoran-American gangs, and had come to the United States as refugees from 
the civil war. See Chris Kraul, El Salvador Comes to Grips with Gangs, L.A. Times, 
Dec. 13, 2004, at A1. 
342. See Kraul, supra note 341. 
343. See id. 
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ly advocate for military involvement in law enforcement and other heavy-
handed crime control tactics.344  
In the Guatemalan town Palín, which has been hard hit by street crime, 
some locals who are furious about the devastating effects of crime on their qual-
ity of life, and what they perceive to be the ineffectiveness of official criminal 
proceedings, have taken the law into their own hands. Some have tried to burn 
gang members alive and demanded military intervention.345 Yet, according to 
Palín’s Mayor José Enrique López, while the mano dura policies may diminish 
the problem in the short term, they will not solve it: “What we really need are 
jobs, the local textile factories have closed down because they are considered less 
competitive than other Central American nations [sic].”346 Marcela Smutt, pro-
gram coordinator and gang expert at the U.N. Development Program office in 
San Salvador, similarly concludes that the “problem . . . will not be solved until 
leaders find a way to deliver education and jobs.”347 A 2007 report by the U.N. 
Office on Drugs and Crime echoes that “[g]ang culture is a symptom of a dee-
per social malaise that cannot be solved by putting all disaffected street kids be-
hind bars.”348 
The Washington Office on Latin America relates that in 2004, one year after 
the first Salvadoran mano dura law passed, permitting police to use tattoos as 
evidence of gang membership to support arrest, “19,275 people were detained by 
the police on the charge of belonging to a gang. In a striking illustration of what 
happens when police are allowed to carry out detentions based on such arbi-
trary criteria, 91% of those detained were released without charge due to lack of 
evidence.”349 A report by the Harvard Law School International Human Rights 
Clinic also found that mano dura policies characterized by “repressive law en-
forcement-military tactics, mass arrests, and profiling of youth and alleged gang 
members, ha[ve] been ineffective and even counter-productive” in addressing 
crime in the region.350 The Harvard study even suggests that “these repressive 
 
344. See Wash. Office on Latin Am., Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues 
in Human Rights, Effective Policing, and Prevention 5 (2006) (describing 
repressive nature of mano dura policies implemented in El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Guatemala). 
345. See COAV Newsroom, supra note 270. 
346. See id. 
347. See Kraul, supra note 341. 
348. See Press Release, U.N. Info. Serv., Violent Crime and Drug Trafficking Pose Se-
rious Threats to Development in Central America, UNODC Warns, UNIS/ 
NAR/1003 (May 23, 2007). 
349. Wash. Office on Latin Am., supra note 344, at 10-11. 
350. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Harv. Law Sch., No Place To Hide: Gang, 
State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador, at iv (2007), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/ programs/hrp/documents/FinalElSalvadorReport(3-
6-07).pdf. 
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crime fighting plans have provided ideological and rhetorical support for social 
cleansing groups” who have “targeted alleged criminals for extrajudicial kil-
lings,” justifying their actions “with assertions that ‘the laws of the country were 
not working’. . . .”351 In training and subsidizing implicated law enforcement of-
fices, U.S. criminal justice export programs are associated, even if only indirect-
ly, with criminal law enforcement agencies engaged in practices of arbitrary, 
mass arrests and other repressive tactics.  
Over the twenty-year period of U.S. criminal justice assistance in El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, and Honduras, mano dura policies, transnational crime con-
trol, and arrest sweeps of young men with tattoos have not been effective in im-
proving public perceptions of security and safety. A poll of Salvadorans 
conducted by the Universidad Centroamericana found that a significant ma-
jority of the population “identif[ies] as the principal failures of the present ad-
ministration the battle against criminality . . . .”352 This result is consistent with 
studies of other states in Latin America: A Latinobarometro poll reported that 
only one of every three Latin Americans had confidence in their state’s police.353  
The problems facing states that are recipients of U.S. criminal justice export 
are many: cycles of violence fueled by unequal resource distribution and social 
inequality, incongruities of transnational crime priorities with recipient country 
crime landscapes, procedural dysfunction in under-resourced criminal justice 
systems, and the potentially illiberal and anti-democratic applications of U.S. 
training and technical assistance. These problems ought to be sufficient to pro-
voke serious reconsideration of fusing U.S. transnational crime control initia-
tives and criminal procedural reform programming, especially absent any per-
suasive contrary evidence from criminal justice exporters themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Article has examined how and why U.S. criminal justice export took 
shape in the post-Cold War period through the deployment of U.S. prosecutors 
and police officers across the globe. Merging promotion of criminal procedure 
reform with transnational crime control initiatives, U.S. criminal justice export 
came to serve as a form of global governance through crime. U.S. programs fo-
cused less powerful states on U.S. transnational crime priorities; worked within 
foreign internal security apparatuses; framed complex social problems in terms 
of criminally culpable perpetrators and deserving victims; and directed atten-
 
351. Id. at 17 (internal quotations omitted); id. at 15 (quoting Amnesty Internation-
al, El Salvador: The Spectre of Death Squads (1996)). 
352. Mano-Dura Policies and International Community Blamed as El Salvador’s Violence 
Continues Unabated, NotiCen: Cent. Am. & Caribbean Affairs, June 14, 2007 
(quoting Jannet Aguilar, Director of Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, 
Universidad Centroamericana). 
353. See, e.g., The Battle for Safer Streets: Crime and Policing in Latin America, Econo-
mist, Oct. 2, 2004, at 53. 
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tion to criminal law administration as a proposed remedy for a variety of con-
cerns.  
However, even as U.S. criminal justice export proliferated rapidly, the asso-
ciated outcomes in recipient locations remain mostly unknown. U.S. programs’ 
reports of “success” have failed to account for actual effects on the ground as 
means substitute for ends and weak associations are confused for causation. In 
contrast, the existing evidence regarding the aftermath of reform in Central 
America, a region heavily targeted by U.S. consultants for over two decades, 
suggests that U.S.-sponsored transnational crime and justice sector reforms 
have not improved public perceptions of security or justice sector administra-
tion. Instead, U.S. programs allocate scarce resources to transnational crime 
concerns often incongruous with local harms and to procedure reforms that 
have proven largely dysfunctional as a consequence of resource deficits, and in 
ways that are roughly analogous to forms of criminal procedural dysfunction 
within the United States. Further, there is every reason to believe that the global 
concerns framed by U.S. actors in reference to crime control are symptomatic 
of, and cannot be mitigated without first confronting, more profound problems 
relating to resource distribution and social inequality.  
Given these limitations, the question remains: What institutional alterna-
tives are available? One recourse would be to dismantle the institutional archi-
tecture of U.S. criminal justice export and to re-direct associated funds to 
projects that are better able to contain interpersonal violence and promote hu-
man welfare in affected regions.  
In Latin America, a number of states have begun to explore such alterna-
tives. Some Latin American states have refused U.S. internal security assistance 
and are pursuing other internal security approaches. Several member states of 
the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, an alliance of Latin American states 
identified with a progressive social democratic ethos, withdrew their security 
forces from U.S. training administered at the Western Hemisphere Institute for 
National Security Cooperation.354 Other Latin American states have sought to 
invest in infrastructure development—for example, public transportation net-
works and street lighting projects—as a means of improving citizens’ security.355 
As described in Subsection III.B.2, the Chile-based CEJA has launched a coor-
dinated effort to carefully monitor the progress of procedure reforms across 
Latin America, assuming control of this work from foreign consultants. CEJA 
aims to provide detailed, empirically grounded feedback to the impacted sys-
tems in order to facilitate context-sensitive improvements and adjustments. Ra-
 
354. See Simon Romero, Bolivian Is an Uneasy Ally as U.S. Presses Drug War, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 28, 2008, at 3 (describing Bolivian President Evo Morales’ decision to 
stop sending officers to receive U.S. combat training). 
355. See, e.g., Vera Lucía Vecentini et al., Inter-American Dev. Bank, Peru: 
Metropolitan Lima Urban Transportation Program (PTUL)—North-
South Subsystem: Loan Proposal 5, 13, 38 (2004) (proposing that improve-
ments to citizen safety will be associated with improving public transport and 
street lighting). 
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ther than focusing on particular crime priorities or implementing specific crim-
inal procedure mechanisms, these alternatives aim more generally toward an 
autonomous and enhanced security and justice sector climate. This climate 
would include more empirically informed justice sector administration, better 
access to jobs in urban areas through accessible public transport, and brighter 
(and hence more visible and presumably safer) urban streets during nighttime 
hours. These are relatively small-scale interventions, but ones that may better 
respond to affected states’ needs than the policies promoted by U.S. criminal 
justice export programs. 
To the extent, though, that existing U.S. criminal justice export frameworks 
are too deeply entrenched to be readily abandoned, and insofar as U.S. transna-
tional crime priorities remain of concern to U.S. and foreign state actors, then 
criminal justice policies ought to focus on mitigating the context-specific condi-
tions driving particular areas of concern. As the foregoing analysis suggests, 
these context-specific conditions have much to do with the inter-relationships 
among poverty, social inequality, and lack of licit opportunities for improve-
ment of individuals’ life chances.356 One criminal justice alternative, “alternative 
livelihoods” programming, focuses precisely on alleviating the harms produced 
by these interrelated problems, seeking to facilitate alternative life paths.357  
Alternative livelihoods programs aim to motivate and enable individuals’ 
interests in alternative conduct through external funding and assistance with 
accessing relevant markets. For example, U.N. alternative development pro-
gramming has presented an opportunity to coca crop growers in the Andean 
region to experiment on a small scale and to transition gradually to growing 
coffee or oil palm if they so choose. In much of the Andes, the production of 
coca leaf itself is not understood to be criminal, as opposed to conversion of the 
raw material into cocaine, and in this context, the alternative livelihoods pro-
grams seek to incentivize preferred market activity.358 Simultaneously, the U.N. 
program subsidizes and facilitates access to local, national, and international 
markets until such time as alternative livelihoods projects are self-sustaining.359  
The Bolivian government has launched a related program seeking to con-
nect coca crop growers with manufacturers who can turn coca leaf into tea, 
toothpaste, soda, and flour, rather than cocaine.360 This program takes a similar 
 
356. See generally Pablo Fajnzylber et al., World Bank, Determinants of Crime 
Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment, at vii 
(1998); Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 530 (2000) 
(exploring the relationship between inequality and crime). 
357. See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Alternative Development: A Global 
Thematic Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (2005). 
358. See id. at v-vi, 12-13. 
359. See id. at vii. 
360. See Evo Morales Launches ‘Coca Colla,’ Telegraph, Jan. 10, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/bolivia/6962746/Evo-
Morales-launches-Coca-Colla.html. 
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approach to the U.N. initiative in facilitating non-cocaine-linked trade, but the 
Bolivian project serves to preserve the central place that coca leaf cultivation oc-
cupies for many indigenous peoples in the Andes.361 
There are some initial indications that alternative development program-
ming may be able to improve affected individuals’ quality of life and reduce in-
terpersonal violence and criminalized market participation. A study on alterna-
tive development programs by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime found that 
alternative development projects can succeed if they “identify reliable markets 
at the local, national and/or international levels and [] link the products or ser-
vices to be promoted by alternative development activities to those markets.”362 
While alternative livelihood projects are not without their problems, they may 
provide an effective harm reduction model for narcotics regulation at least 
where former drug crop growers and drug sellers are assisted in moving to 
sponsored alternatives without having first to destroy or abandon their existing 
means of subsistence. Under such circumstances, many ultimately move entire-
ly to the alternative option if it better provides for their families and facilitates 
greater security.363 Success in these terms is defined both by voluntarily transi-
tioning individuals to alternative livelihoods, and improving their quality of life 
in relative terms.  
Although the most obvious application of alternative livelihoods initiatives 
is to criminalized markets, and specifically to diminished production of drug 
crops that fuel narco-trafficking as opposed to crime directly involving inter-
personal violence, equitable development-stimulating processes also have the 
potential to reduce violent crime. The violence-reducing potential of alternative 
development programming is at least initially reinforced by those farmers in a 
U.N. Alternative Livelihoods Study who report “better security as the main and 
most sustainable impact of alternative development.”364 The alternative livelih-
oods model may also be employed to facilitate alternative life paths for other at-
risk populations in high-violence areas, such as those involved in or at risk of 
being harmed by human trafficking or gangs.365  
 
361. Id. 
362. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 357, at 13. 
363. See id. The United States does not allow funds for alternative development un-
linked to eradication, but European donors do not place such restrictions. See id. 
at 11. 
364. See id. at vi. 
365. This possibility is consistent with an emerging consensus among development ex-
perts on the nexus of violence and inequality. See, e.g., Heinemann & Verner, su-
pra note 270, at 16 (“Promoting pro-poor growth and equitable development to 
reduce the stark levels of inequality is key to curbing the violence pandemic . . . . 
[P]reventive measures and innovative social policies are efficient and under-
utilized strategies to address the problem. Violence prevention is inseparable from 
equitable development and social action.”). 
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These programs simultaneously serve to counter the tendency of conven-
tional criminal justice frameworks to conceive of complex social problems in 
terms of criminally culpable bad actors and deserving victims. Instead, alterna-
tive livelihoods initiatives re-cast criminal justice concerns so as to enable per-
sons to transition to alternative life paths. Through this approach, alternative 
livelihoods programming seeks to respond to the series of problems associated 
with current models of U.S. criminal justice export illuminated in Part III, 
namely: (1) the imposition of pre-defined (transnational crime and criminal 
procedural) concerns on local contexts without careful attention to associated 
costs and consequences; (2) the focus on conventional crime control approach-
es to the exclusion of non-punitive, non-arrest, and extrajudicial strategies that 
might better limit particular harms; and (3) the lack of democratic accountabili-
ty, above all with regard to inattention to persistent local needs, inequitable de-
velopment, and law enforcement excesses. 
The lack of democratic accountability of U.S. criminal justice export pro-
grams is inherent in their top-down imposition of a specific U.S.-determined 
transnational crime agenda. This characteristic thus cannot be eliminated simp-
ly by inserting a different set of practices determined by other experts to be 
more amenable to developing states and less wed to U.S. transnational crime 
concerns. Instead, particular alternative livelihoods programs, though not nec-
essarily directly replicable elsewhere, reflect the scale and conceptual orientation 
of projects that may better address criminalized harms in locations that have 
become recipients of U.S. criminal justice export. Such programs may even bet-
ter serve the needs of areas of the United States that have been subject to uneven 
development and pervasive intervention by U.S. criminal justice administra-
tion. Alternative livelihoods programming, then, is not a criminal justice reform 
solution that ought to be exported by U.S. consultants in lieu of current models, 
but rather represents an innovation indicative of ways local and transnational 
publics might imagine criminal justice alternatives that both depart and learn 
from the limitations of existing models.  
If foreign legal assistance seeks to promote greater stability, equality, and 
prosperity, and if it is to be more than a means and an end unto itself, it should 
work in the service of people who have already developed or who wish to devel-
op context-sensitive mechanisms that will mollify the most undemocratic, des-
tabilizing, and harmful forces in their lives. Criminal justice reforms may con-
tribute to some of these objectives by crafting measures to render law 
enforcement responsive to local needs, in some cases initially by facilitating spe-
cific alternative livelihoods for individuals participating in criminal black mar-
kets, and by supporting small-scale grassroots initiatives to improve the life 
chances of young people most at risk of violence. The role for lawyers and legal 
scholars in this work, and for legal academics in particular, could be to study, 
theorize, and if normatively or empirically defensible, to defend these possibili-
ties. And, above all to assist, not lead (an important difference noted by the Law 
and Development Movement’s auto-critique), in creating legal and other me-
chanisms abroad and at home to temper the cruelest consequences of uneven 
development and to make space for alternative development paths. Through 
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this process, we in the United States especially may be able to learn something 
about how to begin to resolve some of the crises that pervade our own criminal 
justice systems, and to fashion more humane criminal justice policies and glob-
al social orders. 
